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ABSTRACT
The traditional base of legitimacy of private enter-
prise has been eroded by behavior of large powerful cor-
porations and subsequent shifts in public values and per-
ceptions. The ideas which provided social legitimacy to
private enterprise are challenged and confuse people who
still cling to them as a source of legitimacy.
In this period of reassessment of traditional values
and assumptions, criteria to judge whether or how changes
should be made are needed. This paper is an attempt to
understand the necessity of reassessment of traditional
values and establish some criteria for that process.
One criterion can be the notion of social consensus.
Social consensus is the context in which individuals in-
teract with each other in society under shared understand-
ings, expectations, andi norms. These common perceptions
are formed through the us. of ideology. The importance of
ideology cannot be overstated for it is the tool which le-
gitimizes the existing social order upon which social, eco-
nomic, and political institutions are erected.
Business ideology treated in this paper is viewed from
the perspective of strain theory of ideology. According to
the strain theory, business ideology is a set of shared va-
lues or understanding which rises out of a patterned react-
ion to the patterned strains of a social role. The various
sources of strains are examined in Chapter III to be follow-
ed by a discussion of the corresponding ideology, that is,
a patterned reaction in Chapter V.
In particular, Chapter V examines the ethical founda-
tion of business ideology. The "values" behind business
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ideology can be traced to ethical theories. Like ethical
theories, these values define the concept of a good socie-
ty. The three creteria of a good society - efficiency,
equality, and freedom - are all sympathetically espoused
in business ideology.
The last four chapters examine the controversial is-
sues concerning the role and legitimacy of private enter-
prise in a broad social context. Chapter VI compares the
classical (narrow) view of social responsibility as prin-
cipally advocated by Milton Friedman and the social con-
tract view of social responsibility. These views tend to
be extreme and forget to distinguish between the large and
small private enterprises. The author supports laws which
treat large and small firms differentially in terms of so-
cial responsibility.
Chapter VII is a general discussion of hostility to
free enterprise systems (market or capitalist systems) and
Chapter VIII is devoted to sources of hostility to the market
system in the less dveloped countries. Finally, Chapter
IX concludes with a discussion of government regulation -
the nature of pressures which motivate government expansion
into business activities and the subsequent effects of these
government actions.
. This paper is confined to a limited examination of some
of the controversial issues concerning the legitimacy of
private enterprise so as to be a source of discussion for
the people who are interested in the topic. To present an-
other set of values or ideas which can be a basis of legiti-
macy for today's corporations is an immense task and beyond
the scope of this paper.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard D. Robinson
Title : Professor of International Management
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There is very little new or original in this paper.
It is a simple arrangement of ideas on business and the role
it plays today in our society. More precisely, the paper
explores the function of "business ideology" within the
context of a "good" society.
Given the record of accomplishment of the capitalist
society, it is pertinent to ask why capitalism today con-
fronts such serious challenges not only in the uncommitted
nations but in those nations to which it has brought an unpre-
cedented high standard of living. One of the plausible ans-
wers to this may be the absence of a clearly articulated
ideology that appropriately reflects the views and values
of the public and which can provide a basis for the forma-
tion of a social consensus.
The reader may justifiably feel skeptical about the
contents of this paper partly because this is not a work of
an expert but a study done for personal satisfaction of in-
tellectual curiosity of the writer and partly because some
inconsistencies among the conflicting ideas presented in
this paper are not satisfactorily resolved. Moreover, the
subjective ideas presented here may seem extreme or subject-
ive. In all cases, I am grateful to the reader for suffer-
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ing through these unresolved contradictions and inept syn-
thesis of the ideas. I hope that through these limitations
of the paper further reflections and discussions on the sub-
ject are generated.
As a source of this study, I relied on the books which
have the ideas of businessmen, economists, sociologists and
philosophers. As for the framework of this paper, I am
much indebted to Francis X. Sutton's work on American bu-
siness ideology. Without his coherent structure of business
ideology, I would have been unable to produce this paper.
A philosopher once said that "We cannot be impartial
but we can be intellectually honest. Impartiality is a
dream and honesty a duty." My bias is very closely articu-
lated by Milton Friedman, by what is called a free enterpr.se
system as a means of economic organization.
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II. NATURE OF IDEOLOGY
The age of mass communication in many industrial or
industrializing societies has heralded a pervasive sense of
moral bankrupcy, Through newspapers, radio, television,
and sometimes from an unlikely source of information such
as China's walls of freedom, revelations of illicit actions
by business or government leaders continuously undermine
the moral fibre of te community. Moreover, the business
and the nation are burdened with a sense of illegitimacy
and consequently its institutions are plagued by a lack of
authority. A growing discrepancy between the distrust of
business and governmel.t on one hand and the enlargement of
expectations from them polarizes the problem.
The perceptions of morality become increasingly obscure
and the tide of skepticism rises calling into question the
society's allocation of wealth and power. The ideas and as-
sumptions which provided the legitimatizing foundation to
the existing institutions are being eroded. In this age of
uncertainty when old values and assumptions are no longer
reliable as guides into the future, there seem to be few
criteria to judge whether or how changes should be made.
One criterion which sheds some light into this darkness
- 9 -
is the theory of social consensus in an industrial society.1
Social consensus is the context in which individuals inter-
act with each other interrelated by a common umbrella of
"shared understandings", expectations, and norms. It is a
body of ideas, beliefs and values whose primary function is
to legitimize the distribution of wealth and power among
individuals and groups.
In societies the distinction between proper au-
thority and unwarranted domination, between
just reward and ill-gotten gain, between the ob-
ject of respect and the target of resentment, is
defined in accordance with this consensus.2
In order for the established consensus to maintain re-
levance and adequacy in periods of social flux, it is es-
sential to alter or rearrange the consensus to correctly
reflect the perceptions of the society. The presence of a
consensus is undeniable in all aspects of man's activity in
society. An old consensus may break down and a new consen-
sus is developed to take the place of the old. It is a con-
tinual. dialectical process. We will now examine how this
consensus is formed through the use of ideology.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
1Clark Kerr, Industrialism and Industrial Man CNew York:
Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 25.
2Byron K. Marshall, Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar
Japan: The Ideology of the Business Elite, 1868-1941
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967) p. 1.
i
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Behind every decision made in our society, there exists
an underlying ideology, explicit or implicit. Sometimes
the ideology is overt and explicit. We cannot but be aware
of this type of explicit ideology for we read and hear about
it through articulate dissertations or public political
rallies. However, there is another kind of ideology which
rarely intrudes upon our consciousness as such, but which
nevertheless profoundly influences our actions and thoughts.
This implicit ideology is more subtle and concealed. I sus-
pect that explicit ideology constitutes only a part of our
dependence on ideology and that we are as much dominated by
a reliance on the implicit ideology.
Rarely does it enter our awareness that common day-to-
day activities have ideological implications. Typically,
we recognize ideology in political pamphlets or platforms,
thinking that an individual's decision to buy Nestle's hot
chocolate mix is independent and unrelated to ideological
tendencies. In the realm of economic activities, even the
most unremarkable economic decisions owe its origin to
being ideas before they are decisions.3 These ideas are
transformed into decisions which are then materialized into
goods. Economic choices of producing one good or other for
3R.J. Monsen, Modern American Capitalism: Ideologies and
Issues (Boston: Houghton Miff'lin Co., 1963) p. 1.
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one person or other have been and continue to be made every
day throughout the world. The choices on what, how, and
for whom to produce in a way carve out a description of a
particular society. The ideas behind the choices represent
the society's attempt to give some justification or ratio-
nalization for itself. This justification or rationaliza-
tion can be identified as the beginning of the society's
ideology.
An ideology is the medium through which a social con-
sensus is shaped and maintained. Therefore an ideology is
essentially a social consensus articulated, systematized,
and clarified. It is necessary to transform the feelings,
beliefs, and values into a dominant set of id:as which can
provide guidance and direction to a society. It is a system
of ideas which provides an interpretation of the values which
constitute a "good community". Through the use of a ideo-
logy, a community defines and applies values to appropriate-
ly reflect its history, environment, and aspirations. These
conditions in turn affect the nature of the society's ideo-
logy. "Ideology is thus a living structure, a bridge by
which values are given specific meaning in various cultures
at different points in space and time.4 The ideology behind
the consensus legitimizes the existing order and its actions.
4George C. Lodge, The New American Ideology (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1976), p. 8.
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It is the foundation upon which social, economic, and poli-
tical institutions are erected.
An absence of social consensus is a symptom of an ill-
ness which can be traced back to the nature of the ideology.
The life span of an ideology begins with its power to inter-
pret the social realities in terms of the objectives, prio-
rities and criteria of a community and should end with its
inability to do so without distorting the values universal
to a community. In his analysis of ideology, George Lodge
distinguishes between "the transitory framework of ideology
and the timeless, universal, and noncontroversial values of
which it is an interpretation" and insists that "an undue
loyalty (attachment) to traditional (or outwor) ideology
(that is, an ideology which is unable to reflect the changes
in the real world) can actually kill values".5 Values can
be preserved only through a solid and coherent extension of
the ideological structure which connects them to the social
realities. Once the changes in the real world stop to be
reflected in the framework of ideology, then the values are
misrepresented by the ideology's erroneous interpretation
of the social realities. In the following discussions, I
would like to examine some of the alternative views on ideo-
logy.
SLodge, The New American Ideology, p. 21.
I
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Richard Bendix, in his study of ideas in organizations,
defines managerial ideology as "all ideas which are espou-
sed by or for those who exercise authority in economic en-
terprises, and which seek to explain and justify that au-
thority."6 The managerial ideology translates the reali-
ties of authority in neutralizing or cooperative terms to
alleviate the tension between the few and the many, and
thereby to promote a more effective exercise of authority.
This may be achieved through a non-exercise of authority
by the few merely commanding what the many already want or
through justifications on the basis of qualities of excel-
lence possessed by the few. Here, the ideology is an inter-
pretation of authority as opposed to ideology as an inter-
pretation of values as discussed earlier.
The most enigmatic element in the construction and main-
tenaince of a shared perception of the social reality (or a
consensus) of an institution is the threat of discrepancies
originating from individual perceptions or some external de-
velopments.7 An ideology provides a protection from such
discrepancies. One prevalent view of ideology espoused by
social scientists is that it is basically a distorted per-
ception of reality. Ideology is supposedly biased in con-
trast to the "disinterested selectivity of science".
6Bendix, R. The Impact of Ideas on Organizational Structure,
p. 529.
7Kenneth Thompson and Graeme Salamon, ed., Control and Ideo-
logy in Organizations (Mildon Keunes, England: Open
University Press, 1980), p. 229.
Ibid., p. 293.
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The common perception that the function of business
ideology is that of promoting the economic interests of
businessmen or perpetuating a given structure of authority
9
conforms to the traditional interest theory of ideology.
In the interest theory, ideologies of management can be
explained only as rationalization of self interest which
has been formulated from the historical legacies of ins-
titutions and ideas. An interest theory tends to utilize
a battle field image in which ideas become weapons em-
*ployed in a clash of beliefs. This can be distinguished
from the strain theory of ideology in which an "ideology
is a patterned reaction to thepatterned strains of a so-
cial role."10
Sutton and his colleagues Harris, Kaysen, and Tobin
observed ideology from a socio-psychological viewpoint of
the role strains as experienced by the businessmen. Sutton
defines ideology as any ystem df beliefs which is expressed
with the salient purpose of influencing the opinion and ac-
tions of others.ll In particular, the American business
ideology is seen as functioning to sustain individuals in
9 Thompson Salomon, Control and Ideology in Organizations, p.23 1.
1 0Francis X. Sutton et. al., The American --3iness Creed,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 307-308.
Ibid., p. 2.
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the face of chronic strain, either by denying it outright
or by legitimizing it in terms of higher values.
In the strain theory, anxieties stem from inconsis-
tencies in social structure - such as contradictory role
expectations or discrepancies between various goals and
norms. Therefore strain theory provides an ideology with
which to cope intellectually (and emotionally) with the
discrepancies in social and cultural structure. The strain
theory, as propounded by Sutton, insists that the business
ideology can best be explained in terms of the strains to
which men in the business role are almost inevitably sub-
ject. However, Sutton's analysis can be criticized for
taking public statemeats as evidence of ideology, while
admittiig that there may be discrepancies between public
statements and private beliefs.
Sutton explains that businessmen adhere to their parti-
cular ideology because of
"the emotional conflicts, the anxieties, and their
doubts engendered by the actions which their roles
as businessmen compel them to take and by the con-
flicting demands of other social ro es which they
must play in family and community." 2
1 2 Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 11.Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 11.
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Businessmen formulate a specific ideology in an attempt to
resolve or, in the least, reduce the conflicts and anxie-
ties resulting from these strains. Accordingly, the con-
tent of the ideology is shaped within the context of both
cultural heritage and public acceptability.
The function of ideology for the individual business-
man is to enable him to sustain his psychological equili-
brium to satisfy the demands of his profession. It should
be pointed out that a business role is not uniquely sub-
ject to strains in a society. All roles naturally carry
strains in various degrees, some more than that of the
businessman. Moreover, business ideology is not the only
set of beliefs related to the strains of some role. How-
ever, Sutton and his colleagues take the business ideology
as a test of their theory.
In the following discussion, I would like to examine
the interest and strain theories of ideology in more detail
and summarize my reasons for rejecting the interest theory
of ideology and accepting the strain theory of ideology.
In the interest theory, ideology simply reflects a
narrow self interest of its supporters.l3 Ideology juggles
13Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 12.
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symbols and logic to prevail upon others to take actions
from which the ideologist stands to gain. The ideologist
may not necessarily believe in his own words. When he does
believe them, it is through an accidental coincidence of
truth and self-interest. In fact, the correlation between
a particular ideology and economic interest is rarely clear.
An example is furnished by a businessman's fervent sup-
port of the principle of balanced federal budget.1 4 Most
probably, the businessmen dit not arrive at this conclusion
from an econometric analysis of the effects of the altern-
ative budgetary policies on their profit prospects. Notwith-
standing, the businessmen's position is maintained with so
much confidence and unanimity, such that, according to the
interest theory, we cannot but conclude that they have cal
culated their interests on the policy. Furthermore, if we
widen the notion of self-interest by encompassing psycholo-
gical satisfactions other than economic return, the theory
will be reduced to a self-circulating tautology where the
objective and motivation of an act concurs. That is "men
act in their own interests" becomes "men act as the are mo-
tivated to act."15
14 Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 13.
Ibid.
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The general assumptions and propositions of the strain
theory of ideology are outlined by Sutton in great detail.
He begins with the proposition on the unreflective nature of
human actions. A great deal of human activity (like walk-
ing, talking, greeting, and so on) is automatically executed
without reflection. Only the exceptional persons turn their
attention to the problems of the society. The questions
that men like Andr6 Gide ask as to the app.ropriateness of
conventional acceptance of advantages of birth interest few
people. On the one hand, the modern society is
One with very marked egalitarian values and much
ideology in support thereof. Still it does not
demand any radical denials of the ties of kinship,
even though these ties inevitably lead to differ-
ential advantages which are difficultlgo justify
(in terms of the egalitarian values)l
The explanations for this unreflectiveness is found in
the nature of the society and in the way it casts the person-
alities of its members. The rewards and punishments are me-
tered out to its members as their behaviors are adopted or
rejected. The society molds human behavior to such an ex-
tent that alternatives remain unconceived or rejected as un-
16Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 305.
-
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natural. In the process of human socialization, whole cate-
gories of potential questions or choices Cgenerated through
the discussion of these questions) are "resolved (or elimi-
nated) in advance, and the solutions are internalized to be-
come working parts of personality."l 7
Even with these "internalized" solutions, a society
must cope with conflicts from functional problems. "The
classic antinomies of freedom and security, or efficiency
and humane flexibility remind us that meeting one problem
effectively may weaken a society's capacity to meet another".l8
These imperfections are experienced by the individuals in
the society as "strains", say in situations when expecta-
tions which they believed to be legitimate are thwarted or
when there are conflicting demands made upon them. Moreover,
human personalities tend to carry an accumulation of yet un-
resolved conflicts from earlier experiences and these further
exacerbate the strains experienced at any given time.
As mentioned earlier, strains are not unique to any so-
ciety. In fact, they are "normal" in the sense that indi-
viduals must regularly turn out solutions to meet these
strains. Even though a fundamental part of human actions
are unreflective conformity with the cultural heritage, ne-
vertheless, there is a strong need for a body of explicit
7Sutton, the American Business Creed, p. 306.
1 8 Ibid.
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ideas that works as the guiding principles which reduce or
eliminate the conflicts. It is for this purpose, of alle-
viating the burden of the strains, that man becomes conscious
of his actions explicity.
Business ideology can be viewed as "shared understand-
ing" that grows out of common experiences.19 This shared
understanding has some common patterns since it is shaped
and revised as "a patterned reaction to the patterned strains
of a social role". Therefore, the strains experienced by
the members are not random. The strains follow certain pat-
terns. "Human behavior in social systems is patterned in
a body of insititutions and roles, and strains are patterned
accordingly." 20 Although the degree of strains varies with
each situation, any role in a social system implies some
kind of patterned strains. The reactions to these patterned
strains have a definite pattern as well. Thus we are able
to discover the structure of ideology through a study of the
above discussed patterns.
In situations of conflicting demands, or strains, the
individual responds with an elaborate system of ideas and
symbols. This is the significant relationship, that is, the
link between the strains and the ideology. Unfortunately,
19Reinhard Bendix, IWork and Authority in Industry (New York:
Harper Row, 1963), Xii.
20Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 30.
i
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a simple linkage is not possible. A one-to-one correspon-
dence cannot be expected since more than one symbol can
refer to a given strain and a particular symbol may be used
in response to more than one strain. Moreover, ideology
is a "symbolic outlet for the emotional energy which the
21
strain creates". Finally, individual businessmen differ
in their personalities and in their tolerance (or quantita-
tive reactions) for strain-producing roles. However, qua-
litative uniformities can be discerned in the patterned
strains of the role and accordingly in the ideological re-
actions.
21Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 308.
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III. SOURCES OF STRAINS
1. Generalized Standard of Success
In a modern society, achievement in one's profession
is such an important goal of the adult life that its attain-
'ment causes strains and tensions. For young men from all
kinds of backgrounds, the competition to attain a high posi-
tion in a prestigious occupation is fierce. A businessman
must make at least a moderate success of his career if he
is to win the respect of his fellows and satisfy his own am-
bitions. But only a few reach the top of the ladder, and
this fact obviously creates strains on those at the bottom
of the ladder. In te:ms of the dominant values, they are
considered to be failures.
A business that is holding its own is thought to be
stagnant or otherwise undistiguished. The firm that ruins
its competitors by "stealing" their market with a new pro-
duct is called innovative, dynamic, and a success. So is
the one which makes a fortune through the use of clever ad-
vertisements which pull the wool over our eyes. There is
a constant pressure to do something to churn out additional
"success". The subordination of other interests to a gen-
eralized criteria of business success is a --'irce of anxiety
to many businessmen.l A concern for the quality of products
Francis Sutton et. al., The American Business Creed, (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 330.
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or the welfare of the consuming public is naturally compa-
tible with good business, but such concern must be second-
ary to the primary goal set by the economic criteria of
profitability.
The tendencies in our society to narrow the standards
of "success" is a sure source of strain, especially when
there is a large discrepancy between the economic and moral
criteria of "success". Because business is conducted for
profit it is taken for granted that successful managers or
oil discoverers are morally inferior to a faithful nurse or
worker, a great poet or philosopher. A business supposedly
supplies bubble gum rather than inspirational tracts to
youngsters if the former sells better. It caters to those
who can pay ather than those in need.2
The differences in results (in terms of the dominant
definition of "success") seerm unjust since they do not re-
flect any felt o accepted moral differences. Procedural
justice (equality of opportunity) is of little help here
because equality of opportunity may intensify the resentment
generated by the unequal results it necessarily produces
even if people compete in the procedurally most fair manner.
2Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 3.
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2. Self-Orientation (Self-Intere'st)
In a society, man feels some responsibility for his
fellow men or for his community as a whole. This responsi-
bility is defined by a set of institutionalized rules. Tra-
ditionally, the limits of this responsibility has been nar-
row for a business enterprise unlike a charity organization
or a fire house. The institutional responsibility of a bu-
siness enterprise has been limited to the owner-entrepren-
eur or the shareholders. In contrast, a charity organiza-
tion has a direct institutional responsibility towards the
welfare of the community as a whole. So does a firehouse
in its circumscribed function. In other words, a business
enterprise may legitimately (according to its :-nstitution-
alized rules) be self oriented, nlike a charity organiza-
tion or fire house.3
This legitimate self orientation is increasingly eroded
away by social cognition of the affects of the externalities
and by the multiplying expectations of the general public.
Today the self-oriented responsibility of the business enter-
prise has become easy targets of hostility. Even though bu-
sinessmen assert that the pursuit of self:interest does not
mean the pursuit of narrow, immediate material self-interest,
they can not avoit hostility as long as the general public
3Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 339.Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 39.
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has an ambivalent attitude toward "profit" per se.
I would like to devote some space to look at the
issue of self-interest as a source of strain under preva-
lent nationalism by illustrating the case of Japan in the
hope that this can illuminate on other developing countries.
In Japan, the tradition of contempt for open pursuit
of self-interest and suspicious view of commercial endeavor
combined with nationalism shaped the development of Japan-
ese business ideology.4 The traditional values sanctioning
the distribution of wealth, power, and prestige in pre-
industrial Japan were, on the whole, inimical to the inter-
ests of the private business class. Underlying these val-
ues was the widespread acceptance of traditional Confucian
assumptions regarding social stratification. The rank or-
der of the major classes was samurai, peasant, artisan and
merchant. The merchant clas was placed at the bottom of
the four classes and they were treated with contempt by every-
one. The merchants themselves possessed little self-respect.
The assumptions about the moral supremacy of the samurai
way of life justified the dominant political position of
the samurai class.
According to the Confucian tradition, the nature of a
good government demanded the display of th- highest human
4Byron K. Marshall, Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar
Japan: The Ideology of the Business Elite, 13 68-
1941. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1967), p. 115.
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virtues in the personal conduct of the ruling clas.. The
chief human virtue was a selfless devotion to duty, ~hat
is, devotion to the public interests, to the welfz_- of
the state, and the people. This was conceived of ad being
fundamentally opposed to the preoccupation with pr:fit that
was seen as inherent in the merchant way of life. 5ince
the activities of the merchants were thought to be raverned
only by self-interest, the merchant class was rele.;ted to
a social position below even that of the peasantry.
The changes that gradually took place in the relative
economic position of the samurai and merchant classes chal-
lenged the supremacy of the samurai aristocracy. This chal-
lenge intensified the antagonism felt by samurai officials
and moralists toward the merchant class. They feared that
the material succes of the merchant class set a danjerous
example for other classes in the society, and was -er'eived
as a corrupting influence on the national morale. The scho-
lars warned that the rise of the merchants was having a de-
moralizing effect on all classes because people were grad-
ually becoming obsessed with the idea of quick profits, and
were neglecting their regular duties. The farmer ay come
to detest farm work and the samurai may value comfort more
than duty and abandon their allegiance to their lords.
Some scholars even equated profit seeking in exports
and imports with treason. It was generally believed that
I
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the merchants were responsible for undermining the economy
and destroying the moral fiber of the nation. As for the
samurais who were in business, they remained so sensitive
to the public opinion against the pursuit of profit that
they went to great length to prove that they were not mo-
tivated by self-interest. In one example, they even drove
one of their number to suicide as a proof of their honor.5
3. Uncertainty, Limited Control, and Responsibility
Businessmen face the risk of uncertainty daily in their
conduct of their responsibilities. Associated with every
decision they make is a host of uncontrollable and unforseen
factors which may intervene between the execu'tive's action
and the final outcome of his action. He may rely on many
sources of information and counsel, but his alone is the de-
cision and his alone is the responsibility. To say that the
function of a businessman is to make decisions is to give
him responsibility for outcomes of which he has only a limi-
ted control. This combination of responsibility and uncer-
tainty inevitably leads to strain.6
The strain is unavoidable for the businessmen for the
following two reasons. First of all, the overall coordina-
5Marshall, Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar Japan, p. 11.
6Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 332.
i
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tion and direction of the organization are the executive's
responsibilities. An organization cannot be run optimally
with only the aid of the specialized technicians. The pre-
sence of uncertainty and opposing demands necessitates
their resolution in some authoritarian manner. 7 Secondly,
it is impossible for the businessman to prognosticate the
future of the environment in which he operates without some
probability of error.8
It seems unreasonable and impracticable to make him
entirely responsible for the specific outcome of his deci-
sion and subject him to immense strain. In spite of this,
the capacity to make authoritarian decisions is recognized
to be one of the primary qualities of a capable executive.
Indecisiveness, lack of confidence, and signs of anxiety'
are all evidences of weakness for an executive. It is no
accident that such importance is attached to the traits
of confidence and decisiveness.
The frequent reaction to this kind of strain is an
attempt to maximize control of the situation so that uncer-
tainties are minimized. Since competition among rival firms
is one of the most important sources of uncertainty, there
is strong temptation to reduce it or eliminate it through
7Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 332.
8Ibid., p. 393.
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monopolies, cartels and "fair trade" legislation. Many
explain these phenomena as a desire for profit but it is
believed that the desire for security is equally import-
ant.
Another possible reaction is to avoid decisions and
to escape responsibility. Often, a lower-level worker can
act in accordance with a routine defined by an explicit set
of rules. By following the rules, he can avoid assuming
responsibility. But this is not possible to top-level bu-
siness executives. For them, there can be no escape by in-
action or by sticking to well-defined rules. For the res-
ponsible executive, inaction is a decision. 10 Hence, the
executive's reaction in the event of strain i not to evade
action but to do something.
It may be said that executives have internalized the
uncertainty inherent in the operations of their business.
For example, in the determination of the optimum debt struc-
ture, (1) the company seems to have too little debt if the
financial manager sleeps too well; (2) the company seems to
have appropriate debt if the financial manager begins to
worry about the debt; (3) the company seems to have too many
debts if the financial manager has a hard time sleeping at
all.
9Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 335.
10Ibid.
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4. Affective Neutrality (Impersonation)
In the business world, an affective neutrality is per-
vasively required in all interpersonal communications.l
An individual carries a given feeling Csuch as liking, dis-
liking, indifference) in any given social relationship. But
the expressions of these feelings are conditioned by the so-
cial, institutional context of the relationship. It is not
only natural but required as an obligation to be loving to
one's family; whereas, at work, one normally restrains one's
emotions to behave impartially.
Affective neutrality is a distinctive character not
only within the business organization, but in other forms
of economic and social organizations. It provides the means
whereby men with nothing in common other than economic in-
terests can work together; they give some assurance of re-
liable action and fair treatment. Such institutionalized
patterns of affective neutrality are widely familiar and
have a fundamental place in the functioning of our society.1 2
Decisions concerning personnel problems always involve
a conflict between the standards of efficient conduct and
the feelings of personal attachment or responsibility for
others. 13 This conflict is not simply one "between expedien-





cy and humanity." 14 A businessman tends to deve- a pa-
ternalistic sense of responsibility towards his _=naloyees.
Therefore, when a businessman is compelled by t norms of
the business to discharge an employee, his sense :f moral
responsibility rarely permits him to do so withz-- strain.1 5
This affective neutrality may be related t ie anti-
capitalist tendencies in modern society. People -vo feel
insecure for otherreasons may find it difficult -- accept
impersonality in their relationships with others .6 They
seek assurances of responsible concern. Consequ-tly a
network of personal acquaintances is of greater inportance
and assumed friendliness is rather welcomed than e-tested.
Business enterprise is most vulnerable to the charge that
it operates with no responsibility for the securiry of any
of the citizenry.
5. Multiple-Client Relationship
According to the sociologist Everett Hughes, a profes-
sional is "someone who knows better what is good or his
client than the client himself does."17 Such a client-
professional relationship is illustrated by the relations
1Sutton, The American Business Creed, p.
1 5 Ibid., p. 341.
1 6 Ibid., p. 313.
17Everett C. Hughes, Men and Their Work (Glercoe. Ill.: Fee
Press, 1958), p. 1.
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between a doctor and his patient, a lawyer and his client,
and a stockbroker and an investor. Taking off from Hughes'
definition of a professional, Schein surmises that the de-
velopment of moral codes of a professional was necessita-
ted by the vulnerability of the client, who, without the
relevant knowledge, was unable to protect himself.l8
In the modern industrial society, businessmen have
become increasingly "professionalized", professionalized
in -the sense of requiring greater technical or managerial
knowledge and skills. Therefore, we can also' count bu-
sinessmen among the professionals as defined by Hughes. I
will examine the various clients of a business manager and
their respective relationships in the context of a poten-
tian conflict among the independent responsibilities requi-
red from the manager.
A. The Consumer as a Client
Traditional economic theory ignores the problem of po-
tential exploitation of the consumer by assuming that the
market place is perfectly competitive. However, the tradi-
ional economic assumptions have not been validated by exper-
ience. Therefore, the consumer is put in a relatively vul-
nerable position by the wide margin of arbi;'ary control
18Edgar H. Schein, "The Problem of Moral Education for the
Business Manager", p. 4.
i
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available to the manager which can be exercised to the dis-
advantage of the consumer.
B. The Stockholder as a Client
The manager uses his knowledge to generate a reasonable
rate of return on the investment of the stockholders. The
relationship of the manager to the stockholder is primarily
economic, and therefore, the vulnaribility of the client
(in the client-professional context) lies in the possibili-
ty that the manager may violate the economic trust through
a misuse or misallocation of the economic resources entrus-
ted to him.
C. The Community as a Client
The business enterprise, as an employer, a customer,
and a supplier brings many economic benefits to the commu-
nity from its general business activities within the com-
munity. Therefore, the individuals in the community are
highly vulnerable to the company's discriminatory policies
in hiring, purchasing, or other business conducts which
may minimize the economic return to the community.
D. The Enterprise as a Client
The manager holds the life of the business enterprise
for he is responsible for its effiency, maintenance, effect-
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iveness, and growth. So, it is crucial for the company to
elicit the manager's commitment and dedication to the or-
ganizational goals. However, the business enterprise is
an abstraction and does not arouse the kind of identifica-
tion of loyalty and respect that, for instance, a charis-
matic leader might; hence, the importance of commitment
and loyalty to the enterprise as values grow.
The enterprise is vulnerable to indifference, disloy-
alty, negligence, and sabotage; but to protect itself, le-
gal sanctions are frequently not available or ineffetive.
For instance, the business can only fire an apathetic per-
son, but if apathy is widespread, there may be a tendency
to condone such behavior or to develop practices of conceal-
ing it from the top management. 1 9
As a professional, the business manager has obligations
and responsibilites to each of the above clients. "The man-
agerial role, in contrast to other professional roles, tends
to be defined in terms of a system of multiple clients.20
It is unclear which clients have priority. Moreover, the
underlying values of each client-manager relationship are
different from the other. Because of these reasons, a single
19Schein, "The Problem of Moral Education for the Business
Manager," pp. 4 -6.
1
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set of values cannot be specified for the manager, and the
manager is subject to potential conflict situations.
Given the value conflicts faced by the manager we
cannot judge his actions in a particular situation (as good
or bad) before we know which client he was trying to serve.
For example, a manager is expected to make decisions for
the survival and growth of a company even if it may con-
flict with the short-run interests of consumers, stockhol-
ders and the community. The important "value referent" be-
comes the "organization as a whole", and the assumption is
made that in the long run what is good for the organization
will be good for the consumer, the stockholder and the com-
munity.21 Therefore, the manager's decision to hire low
wage lalor is based on the requirements of efficiency
which, at the same time, may be considered immoral. This
potentially conflicting situation derived from the multi-
ple-client relationship, is another sure source of strain
for professional managers.
21Schein, "The Problem of Moral Education or the Business
Manager", p. 9.
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IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF IDEOLOGY
We will now examine the salient characteristics of an
ideology before turning to relate the patterned strains to
the corresponding ideology which can be regarded as a pat-
terned reaction. There are four characteristics in the gen-
eral structure of strain theory of ideology: selectivity,
practicality, simplification, and acceptability.
1. Selectivity
Like all systems of ideas, ideology must abstract from
reality. But ideology is selective in "particular system-
atic ways" because it must respond to and mediate the felt
needs egendered by the kinds of strains which have been
previously discussed. Any concepts not related with these
needs cannot become part of deology.l It is obvious that
business ideology cannot be concerned with all of the insti-
tutions and aspects of our society. "Like other ideologies,
it has special foci of interest."2 Consequently, the pic-
ture of the society delivered by ideology may be incomplete
and inconsistent. But if the ideology is not specific and
selective, then it will leave the businessman at sea with-
out a compass.
Francis Sutton, The American Business Creed (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 316.
2Ibid., p. 265.
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Given the selective nature of ideology, it seems to be
hardly surprising that ideology rarely makes any claim on
the esthetic quality of modern life nor on the superiority
of the moral standards. Nowhere in the ideology is there
any suggestion that conflict exists between religion and
capitalism. To concentrate on such matters would be foreign
to the fundamental value system of the businessman.
2. Practicality
Behind every ideology, there is an intrinsic distrust
of abstract theories and sophisticated arguments of intel-
lectuals and theorists. Business ideology chooses common
sense over abstract speculation, ordinary worcs to profes-
sional jargon and definitions, the declarations of a dis-
tributing agent about prices to analyses of economists. It
does not demand, like Marxism, that it has a "scientific"
character, but it would repudiate being called "unscientific".3
Business ideology proclaims with pride the common
sense experience and wisdom of the real business world, as
a more reliable guide to understanding the economy than any
intellectual authority. In spite of this aversion to ab-
3Sutton, The American Business Creed, p. 348.
- 38 -
stract, sophisticated theory and argument, the ideology
applauds rationality for its nonsentimental perspective.
Businessmen's appreciation of rationality can be surmised
from a compulsion to base their decisions on a sober
assessment of facts, undiluted by wishful thinking and
sentiment.
The pragmatic nature of a business ideology is illus-
trated in the proposal by Doyukai, a group of young pro-
fessional Japanese managers, called "Tentative View of De-
mocratization of Business Enterprises", in early 1947.4
Although it was seer. as a radical departure from tradition-
al Japanese business thinking in its propositions for the
separation of management and ownership, and managerial re-
lations withi labor, it was by no means extreme nor "senti-
mental" when viewed in the context of the times, when the
existing political and economic power structure was serious-
ly threatened. On the contrary, the Doyukai proposals were
pragmatic responses to the great strains the immediate post-
war situation imposed on the Japanese economy.
3. Simlification
Since ideology has an intended purpose of influencing
the minds of the people as defined by Sutt ~- it needs to
4M.Y. Yoshino, Japan's Managerial System: Tradition and
Innovation (Cambridge: MI.I.T. Press, 1968), pp. 98-99.
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be clearly articulated in terms of the relevant experiences
of the individuals and the institutions. It is no easy
matter to translate the complexities of the real world into
a simplified version of a business ideology. The complex
operations of the real world may be grasped in familiar
terms only at the cost of incompleteness and inaccuracy.
Furthermore, business ideology may be challenged by
its critics for the alleged lack of expertise because of
its simplistic nature. This criticism may undo the very ob-
jective behind the ideology, in other words, simplification
may force it to forefeit its power to influence. Neverthe-
less, the abstraction of reality by reduction of complexity
may actually illuminate reality concisely enough if distor-
tions of reality do not interfere with this process of sim-
plification. A symbolic treatment of the whole society is
a natural consequence of this simplification.
4. Acceptability
Since business activity takes place within a large social
framework, it is necessary to maintain a "cultural consis-
tency" with society.5 If the ideology loses the function
of explaining its vision of the good society in relevant
%Clark Kerr et. al., Industrialism and Industrial ian, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 32.
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rhetoric to the society in the context of its cultural
heritage, then it will widen the discrepancy between the
assertions of ideology and the true aspirations of the
masses. This can result in internal tension, conflict
and restlessness which combined can threaten the tradition-
al activity of business. Surely it seems to be the res-
ponsibility of the business to communicate with the public
for a better understanding of the system. In this sense,
"a central function of ideology is to define the crite-
ria by which a business relates economic activity to its
surroundings."6
I would again refer to the case of Japan in order to
illustrate the unsuccessful attempt of presenting an ideo-
logy ac:eptable to the indigenous masses. A group of young
progressive executives of leading corporations dissatisfied
with traditional ideology formed an organization called
Doyukai to frame a "managerial ideology" to meet the growing
strains of rapid economic growth.7 When Doyukai proposed
the "Tentative View of Democratization of Business Enterpri-
ses" in 1947, it was met with mixed reception. Some hailed
it as the business ideology of a new democratic Japan, others
were skeptical, and still others were violently opposed for
6George C. Lodge, The New American Ideology CNew York: Ran-
dom House, 1976J), p. 44.
7Yoshino, Japan's Managerial System, p. 96.
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being too radical and impractical.
Later in 1956 when the political situation continued
to worsen to the point where the very survival of the par-
liamentary democracy was in question, the Doyukai proclai-
med another resolution entitled "The Social Responsibility
of Business Leadership".8 One characteristic of the 1956
resolution was that the American ideology exerted a great
deal of influence on its formation. The Japanese executi-
ves at that time were much impressed with the managerial
strand of business philosophy articulated by the profes-
sional managers in the United States. Thus the 1956 resolu-
tion was often called the Japanese version of American i-
deology.9 However, since the 1956 resolution had not been
totally indigenous to the thinking behind Japanese busi-
ness, it was unable to stand the acid test of crisis.
After the disappointing failure with an imported brand
f managerial ideology, some Japanese businessmen sought to
find guidelines in Japanese tradition. In 1965, after care-
ful deliberations, the Doyukai made another public declara-
tion entitled "A New Managerial Ideology: A Managerial Phi-
losophy in the Japanese Climate".10 It urged business lead-




ers to cooperate with those in other fields such as politics,
religion and education for the development of an ideal so-
ciety.
The declaration insisted that business leaders must
possess not only a high degree of knowledge, but integrity
and moral character as well. Again, it was not unanimously
accepted. Some executives considered the Doyukai as no more
than an exclusive club of idealistic intellectual business-
men. Some delighted in discoveries of discrepancies between
the Doyukai's ideological position and the actual practice
by its propounders. Still others rejected the Doyukai for
their exaggeration of the crisis psychology.11
11Yoshino, Japan's Managerial System, p. 12.
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V. VALUE OF A GOOD SOCIETY
That the role of business in society is solely economic
is a prevalent belief held by people both in and outside the
world of business. Of course, a business enterprise very
much revolves around the economic activities of production
and supply of goods and services to society. However, an
enterprise is also "a social organism composed of people
who are the products of the society in which they live."1'
A business enterprise naturally plays a social as well as
an economic role since its ends are achieved through the
medium of people. Therefore, with these two roles in mind,
a business enterprise strives toward a dual objective in
our society. It serves an economic purpose, to provide
goods and services to the community; and also a social pur-
pose to be a good citizen.
As discussed earlier, the need to rationalize, explain,
articulate, or justify one's activity or profession is faced
by every individual in society. Buisnessmen undertake this
task in various forms of monologues and dialogues. Dialo-
gues with individuals in society or society at large are
essential if the function and nature of business activity
Ross A. Weber, Culture and Management(Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1969), p. 54.
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is not to be misunderstood or misinterpreted and misapplied.
Since business activity takes place within a larger
social framework, business ideology must interpret the act-
ivity not only in terms of its economic implications. Hen-
ce, businessmen are compelled to engage in some sort of
ethical theory. Although some people see little connect-
ion between ethics and business, ethical or moral behavior
in society is a necessarily requisite part of business act-
ivity. Business cannot function in a society where immoral
actions such as stealing, lying, cheating, etc., are encou-
raged. Of course, our society has not been able to eradi-
cate immoral behaviors, nevertheless, pursuit of ethical
norms is undoubtedly a standard social objective. There-
fore, it can be said that business activity has an ethical
as well as an economic objective.
All ethical theories are concerned with explainlug the
nature of a good society. Similarly, business ideology con-
tains a set of "values" which defines the concept of a good
society whether as an explanation or a justification of the
business practices. The source of "values" behind business
ideology through an examination of the three prominent ethi-
cal theories. The discussion of ethical theories are rudi-
mentary and sketchy at best due to the inability of this
paper to accomodate the vast scope of such a subject. Se-
condly, we will look at the connections and conflicts be-
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tween the ethical "values", how the conflicts are reconci-
led, and whether the "values" are applied consistently or
selectively.
This chapter will discuss the importance of ethics in
business ideology contrary to common beliefs. In many ca-
ses, ethical criteria have been adopted as business crite-
ria or adapted to meet the special needs of business prac-
tice. The three ethical theories sketched out in the fol-
lowing paragraphs all attempt to define moral behavior as
required by a good or just society. However, the three the-
ories are each committed to a different criterion of ap-
praising the disposition of society. Thus the theories
have the same end of achieving a moral society, but the
means to this end or the medium of judgement is dissimilar-
ly emphasized by each theory. These essential features of
each ethical theory are discerned in the values behincd bu-
siness ideology.
In the utilitarian theory, the ethics of an action
(the issue of right or wrong) is determined by the conse-
quence of the action. A good society is one in which good
consequences are maximized (the greatest good for the grea-
test numbers). According to utilitarianism, the means to
maximization of the social good is efficiency. Hence, the
ultimate criterion of judging social arrangements is effi-
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ciency since through efficiency the society is able to
reach its goal of a good society.
The egalitarian theory-emphasizes equal opportunity
and distribution of goods except in cases where inequali-
ty would actually work to everyone's benefit. Here, the
major criterion of judging social arrangement is equality.
Under this system of thought, a good society is one in which
equality becomes an end in itself. Thus, an egalitarian
would propose a progressive income tax, and with consisten-
cy, support a "fair" distribution of income to all indivi-
duals. Lastly, libertarian theory holds that justice means
protection of individual freedom.
The three criteria of a good society - efficiency, e-
quality, and freedom - are all sympathetically espoused in
business ideology. What is of interest for us from a point
of view of business ieology divides into two principal is-
sues. The first is the issue of justice, particularly eco-
nomic justice in terms of distribution of benefits and bur-
dens. The second is the issue of freedom or an individual's
right to voluntary economic transactions. Let us look at
these issues in more detail under the three alternative
ethical theories.
First, the utilitarian theory, is committed to maximi-
zation of the "good", that is to "produce the greatest pos-
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sible balance of (good) value for all persons affected."2
A definition of the utilitarian "good" is too complex to
be discussed in full here, so instead, a short outline of
two different views is offered. The "good" is defined by
two divergent theories represented by hedonistic utilita-
rians and pluralistic utilitarians. Whereas the pluralis-
tic utilitarians believe in many intrinsic values, that is,
values besides pleasure with intrinsic worth, i.e. friend-
ship, knowledge, health, and freedom, the hedonistic utili-
tarianism believes that "any act of practice which maximi-
zes pleasure is right."3 We will take the view of the plu-
ralistic utilitarians that the objective function of the so-
ciety is the maximization of the intrinsic values. Again,
without indulging in a full discussion of the meaning of
"intrinsic values", we will move on to how these "values"
are maximized to promote social good.
The key to utilitarian maximization s efficiency since
it enables the economic system to squeeze the maximum pro-
duction from limited economic resources. These produced goods
and services are intended to promote the greatest go)d of
the greatest number.
2Tom L. Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie, ed., Ethical Theory




"The utilitarian commitment to the principle
of optimal productivity through efficiency
is thus an essential part of the traditional
business conception of society (business ideo-
logy) and a standard part of business practice.
The utilitarian theory provides an ethical bridge for
the economic conclusion that efficiency leads to the grea-
test good of society. This becomes the rationale behind the
businessman's emphasis on the profitability of his business.
From the utilitarian perspective, profit is important to
every-businessman, not because it is an end in itself, but
because it is a measure of efficiency which can lead the
greatest number of people to the greatest good.
Business ideology can also be analyzed as a blend of
egoism and utilitarianism. 5 The pursuit of self-interest
by business is an egoistic activity. However, it is also
utilitarian in that corporate and individual egoisms are
believed to lead to maximal utilitarian results. In order
to understand the concept of self-interest in business ideo-
logy, we must distinguish egoism and utilitarianism by first
discriminating between ethical egoism and psychological e-
goism.
The ultimate motive of a psychological egoist for any
4Beauchamp and 3owie, Ethical Theory, p. 4.
5Ibid., p. 8.
- 49 -
act is self-interest, as perceived by him. Ethics involves
the question of "ought" as opposed to "can" in situations
where self-interest conflicts with the interest of others.
But for a psychological egoist, ethics is pointless since
he cannot do what ought to be done under an ethical stand-
ard. A psychological egoist only is capable of self-inter-
est motivated behavior. All other types of behavior, al-
truistic or sympathetic, are ruled out by definition.
Whereas psychological egoism is a theory about human moti-
vation, ethical egoism is a moral theory about what one
"ought to do".6
In ethical egoism, one ought always to act on the ba-
sis of one's self-interest. But since cooperation is nece-
ssary to promote self-interest, pursuit of self-interest
is restrained. Business ethics is the ethics of a restrai-
ned egoist. "It is egoistic because it is an ethic based
on the active pursuit of self-interest. It is restrained
because self-interest is subservient to the rules of busi-
ness practice (or prevalent business ideology). According
to Adam Smith, ethical egoism leads to the greatest good of
the greatest number in society. Smith perceives an egois-
tic world not as one of selfishness and indifference among
6Beauchamp and Bowie, Ethical Theory, pp. 9,10.
Ibid., p. 11.
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men, but one where cooperation rules under the motive of
self-interest. Through an interactive process of self-
interest, called by Smith the "invisible hand", public in-
terest is evolved. Thus Smith believed that individual
egoism led to utilitarian good society.
The utilitarian conclusion is challenged on grounds
that it can lead to a system of injustices.8 An example
is a slave society which produces the greatest happiness
for the greatest number. Does this mean that slavery is
morally obligatory to produce a good society? Utilitar-
ians offer unsatisfactory answers to such a question by
denying as a matter of fact, that the world of human socie-
ties would develop to a state where slavery would in fact
lead to the greatest happiness for the greatest number.9
Application of the utilitarian standard of efficiency
can result in injustice by neglecting nonutilitarian val-
ues such as protection of individuals from being sacrifi-
ced in the name of public good. Other critics of utilitar-
ianism point to its attempt to quantify the unquantifiable.1 0
Values are inherently difficult to measure quantitatively
8Beauchamp and Bowie, Ethical Theory, p. 5.
9Ibid., p. 14.
1 0 Ibid., p. 11.
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or qualitatively. Moreover, utilitarians' ignorance of
the problems of externalities in its measurement of con-
sequences are also criticized.ll
As mentioned earlier, there are two aspects of egali-
tarianism. One is equality of opportunity, the other is
equality of outcome. Egalitarian ethical theory concludes
that each individual in society not only deserves equal
access and share of the economic goods and services but
also will choose to distribute these goods and services
12
equally. Unfortunately, the question of equality is a
very complex issue whose solution evades simple formulas
13
such as "fair share for all".
"The questions at issue are not, for example,
whether employees should be given fair wages,
or shareholders a reasonable return, or custom-
ers or suppliers a fair price. They concern the
priorities with which these conflicting expecta-
tions should be met and are about what is "fair"
and what is "reasonable" at given points in time." 14
In Business ideology, the concept of egalitarianism is
Beauchamp and Bowie, Ethical Theory, p. 13.
1 2Ibid., p. 39.
13Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (New York: Har-
court Brace Jovanovich, 1979), p. 136.
T. Nichols, Ownership, Control and Ideology: An Inquir
into certain Aspects of Modern Business Ideology (Lon-
don, England: Allen and Unwin, 1969), p. 222.
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dealt with somewhat ambivalently. On the one hand, business
ideology upholds egalitarianism in the fairness of opportu-
nities and absence of ascribed status. On the other hand,
business ideology defends inequalities of outcome in income
and political power, and decries any limitations on the free-
15dom of business activities. In fact, the equality of out-
come concept is hard to defend, for it runs into manifold
questions which defy a simple interpretation.
Under the equality of outcome concept, identical re-
sult is not the sought after objective. Rather, the notion
of "fairness" takes the place of identical result as the
criterion to evaluate distribution. But in fact, this goal
of "fairness" is much more ambiguous and undefinable than
identical result. For instance, who is to decide what is
"fair"? Inescapably, it becomes a subjective standard.
Moreover, if people are given "fair" share, whether they en-
gage in productive activity or not, then what incentive is
there to engage in these activities.16
There is also the questions of space and time, the ex-
tent of the commitment to equality of outcome. For ins-
tance, is the equality to be achieved within a family?
Within the U.S.? Wihtin the world? Or is it to be judged
15
Francis Sutton, The American Business Creed,(Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 261.
1 6 Friedman, Choose, p. 135.
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in terms of income per month? Per year? Per decade? Or
per lifetime? The questions continue to the form the
equality is expressed. Is it to be in the form of money?
Food? Housing? Social status?
Friedman helps us refine our understanding of equality,
by distinguishing between two different kinds of inequali-
ty. In one type, the differences in income, power, or sta-
tus are short run differences. Mobility and change opens
up possibilities of new alignments in wealth, leverage,
and position. Here, inequality is a result of the dynamic
changes, social mobility, and equality of opportunity.1 7
In the other type of inequality, the inequities are long
run differences. Rigidity in social hierarchy, inequality
of opportunity, and lack of mobility support a society mar-
ked by a permanent, unchanging inequality. Naturally, a
society under short-run inequalities is preferable to a so-
ciety subject to static long-run inequalities.
Many businessmen are aware that competitive free en-
terprise systems may lead to inequality of result albeit in
the short run, but no other alternative, procedurally more
satisfactory, is found to rectify the imperfect procedural
justice intrinsic in the workings of a capitalist system.1 8
1 7Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 171.
18Beauchamp and Bowie, Ethical Theory, p. 25.
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Anyway, Friedman asserts that the dynamism of a competitive
free enterprise capitalism introduces social' mobility
which undermines a static society.l9
The injustice is said to be greater in those countries
where free market does not exist. Accordingly, the gap be-
tween the poor and the rich in the feudal societies of Me-
dieval Europe, much of modern South America, and centrally
planned societies like India, China, and Russia is wider.20
Life is not fair; but in capitalism, it is less unfair than
in socialism. Marx wrote in the Communist Manifesto "The
proletarians have nothing to lose but chains". But the
chains in Russia are stronger than the chains in the U.S.2 1
To come back to the notion of "fair" share, the key
point is that "there is a fundamental conflict between the
ideal of 'fair shares' or of its (Marxist) precursor, 'to
each according to his needs,' and the ideal of personal li-
berty." The movement for equality failed in England because
it conflicted with man's natural effort to improve his con-
ditions (material as well as other values of success)
through freedom to compete.22 This antagonism between free-
dom and equality, particularly in countries with low stan-
20Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, pp. 171-172.
2 1Friedman, Choose, p. 146.
2 2 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, p. 197.
Friedman, Choose, pp. 135-144.
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dards of living, underlines the conflict between egalitar-
ianism and liberalism or libertarianism.23
Liberalism is founded on the belief in the freedom of
individuals and rights of individuals to safeguard their
freedom. Liberal belief is egalitarian in the sense that
each man has an equal right to freedom. On the one hand,
it supports the equality of rights or equality of oppor-
tunity. On the other hand it fundamentally conflicts with
the egalitarian belief in the equality of outcome or mater-
ial equality on the basis of redistributive justice. There
is an area of agreement that egalitarianism and libertar-
ianism share, but beyond this area, one cannot be both an
egalitarian and a liberal.2 4
In libertarianism, the individual is the ultimate en-
tity in society, and freedom is the ultimate goal of socie-
ty.25 Therefore, justice is done if individual's right of
free choice (in the sense of absence of coercion) is pro-
tected.
23The two words are used interchangeably here, since the
difference is subtle, one being the effect, the other
the will. Their implications for business ideology
produce the same results.
24Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, p. 195.
2 5Ibid., p. 5.
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"Any economic arrangement that we -freely choose
are thus just ... we have a right, without in-
terference, to economic benefits we produce for
ourselves, as well as a right to our voluntary
economic transactions."26
On the line of the utilitarians and Adam Smith's invi-
sible hand, Friedman believes that pursuit of one's own in-
terest promotes the interest of the society. The concept
of self-interest is again iterated as different from myo-
pic selfishness. He defines self-interest as "whatever it
is that interests the participants, whatever they value,
whatever goals they pursue. " 27 Society benefits under a
system in which people make their own choices, motivated
by self-interest. Whether the individual businessman wins
or loses, the society as a whole benefits from his willing-
ness to take a chance. 2 8
Libertarians' ultimate criterion for justice is free-
dom of the individual. Friedman asserts that economic free-
dom is not only a necessary prerequisite to achieving a po-
litical freedom of a free society, but also an end in it-
self. Although many intellectuals tend to discount econo-
mic freedom and stress the importance of political freedom,
Friedman believes that economic freedom is as important to
2 626Beauchamp and Bowie, Ethical Theory, p. 32.
27Friedman, Choose, p. 27.
2 8 Ibid., p. 138.
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most citizens of the country as political freedom. An ex-
ample is a citizen who is deprived of travelling abroad
because of his country's exchange control. This citizen
is denied an essential freedom no less than that of a ci-
tizen who is unable to vacation in a communist country be-
cause of political limitations imposed by his country.29
Furthermore, economic freedom is also a necessary
though insufficient means toward political freedom. This
relationship is evidently supported by the history of the
development of political freedom which accompanied the de-
velopment of capitalist institutions and the free market.3 0
Freedom and concentration of power are diametrically
opposed, for each undermines the other. A government is a
medium through which freedom can be protested, but it can
also become an instrument through which freedom can be de-
stroyed if government is permitted concentration of power.31
Therefore a decentralization of the power of government
through separation of economic power from that of politics
is crucial for the preservation of freedom. Since indivi-
dual freedom can be preserved only through the separation
of economic power from political power, the role of inde-
2 9 Friedman, Choose, p. 8.
3 0 Ibid., p. 9.
3 1 Ibid., pp. 2-3
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pendent economic power (market system) is emphasized as a
necessary check to potentially dangerous concentration of
power in a free society.
The principal "values" behind the three ethical theo-
ries are strongly resounded in business ideology. This may
surprise some people who questioned the social role of bu-
siness apart from its economic one. However, given that
business is very much a "social organism", it is only na-
tural that it should be ruled by the criteria set by ethi-
cal norms of society as much as men are obliged to be gui-
ded. Nevertheless, business ideology has absorbed the ethi-
cal values to a remarkable degree. The foremost standards
of a good society, as outlined by the ethical theories, are
strongly articulated in business ideology. Efficiency, e-
quality of opportunity, and freedom are "values" or criteria
which most businessmen would uphold as guidelines to good
business practice and thereby to a good society. These
"values" were adopted or adapted to meet the special requi-
rements of business activities. Each and all of these "va-
lues" have immensely influenced the goals toward which bu-
sinessmen aspire and the means of achieving those goals.
Throughout this limited study of ethical theories, we
have at various times encountered the issues of freedom and
justice. These two issues summarize the conflicts in the
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"values". The question of injustice behind the utilitarian
criterion of efficiency thrusts the issue of justice against
the issue of freedom and individual rights. In egali-,
tarianism, the notion of "fair share" in opportunity and
distribution raises the problem of incentives and econo-
mic efficiency. The antagonism between egalitarianism and
libertarianism is based on the issue of equity vs. the indivi-
dual's freedom to keep what he earned with his toil. The
source of divergence among the three ethical theories lies
in the fundamental conflict between freedom and justice.
This fundamental conflict is also the very source of dis-
cord and strain in business ideology.
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VI. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF A CORPORATION
An imagery conjured by some intellectuals to depict
capitalism is violent and cynical. The capitalist system
is perceived as an incestual rapist. According to such
an analogy, mother earth is pillaged and laid waste by
its greedy profit-maximizing corporate offsprings. The
response by business to accusations of irresponsibility
toward society's natural and human needs has been to be-
come increasingly involved in social problems.
Business today must confront a whole array of social
issues from pollution to racial discrimination to consumer-
ism which directly and indirectly influence the corporate
policies and operations2 This may be the signal of a new
development in the history of business. Increased social
awareness has aroused re-evaluations of the role of business
in society in an attempt to reconcile what happens in mark-
et with what happens in society. The view that corpora-
tions have a social responsibility that goes beyond the
narrow interests of its stockholders has been gaining wide-
spread support.
1Ernest van den Haag, Capitalism: Sources of Hostility (New
Rochelle, N.Y.: Epoch Books, 1979), p. 115.
2John McDonald, "How Social Responsibility Fits the Game of
Business", Fortune, 11 February, 1980.
However, the traditional function of business is to
sustain a high level of profit. The essence of what is
called free enterprise is to go after profit in any way
that is consistent with the survival of its economic sys-
tem. This classical view is considered as the narrow no-
tion of corporate social responsibility.3
Advocates of the classical view, such as Milton Fried-
man, justify it from a functionalist point of view. They
argue that business, like other groups within society (la-
bor, government, consumers), has its appropriate function
and should concentrate at excelling in that specific func-
tion if a free and good society is to be preserved. Each
group within society committed to a unique function suppo-
sedly creates multiple centers of power and prevents a cen-
tralization of power which can undermine a pluralistic so-
ciety.4 The society further benefits if each of its major
institutions focus on what it does best and not waste time
and resources on tasks it is ill-equipped to handle.
Business distrust of calls for increased social respon-
sibility is based on its reluctance to increase government
3Clarence C. Walton, Corporate Social Responsibilities (Bel-
mont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 54-
82.
4Tom L Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie, ed., Ethical Theor
and Business, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1979) , p. 125.
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control. Businessmen worry that if it was to "expand its
function from making profits to looking after the public
interests, it would be exercising prerogatives appropria-
te to government and hence put itself under government
control." Some businessmen also fear that they would be
put in a disadvantageous position in the game of business
if they answer the calls for social responsibility becau-
se of a lack of an adequate criterion by which it should
be judged.
An alternative view of corporate social responsibility
is offered by the social contract theory. According to the
"social contract" argument, a corporation was permitted to
conduct business by society on the assumption that the bu-
siness practices will lead to the public good.6 The assump-
tion was presumably substantiated by historical precedence.
The medieval guild, royal charters and national corpora-
tions of England such as the East India Company, the nine-
teenth-century American industrial firms all attest to
the view that such business enterprises were permitted on
the belief that their existence worked to the interest of
the public.7




However, members of society -are beginning to challen-
ge the assumption that pursuit of profits yields utilitar-
ian results and demand that the social contract with bu-
siness be changed. That is, society appears no longer to
want industry to allocate the social costs of production
to society at large. The classical theorist may respond
to this new demand by claiming that society, as a party
to a contract, cannot break the contract whenever it is
convenient for society to do so.8 It is unfair to change
the rules of the game when the game is on.
In the preceding paragraphs, I have just briefly out-
lined the arguments surrounding the issue of corporate so-
cial responsibility. Now we will examine both the classi-
cal theory of social responsibility of business, as repre-
sented by Milton Friedman, and the theory of social respon-
sibility based on the concept of social contract under a
closer scrutiny to discern which view holds greater power
of argument.
Friedman alleges that the moment a businessman speaks
eloquently about the social responsibility of business, he
undermines the basis of a free enterprise system. Friedman
8Beauchamp and Bowie, Ethical Theory, p. 126.
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writes
The businessmen believe that they are defending
free enterprise when they declaim that business
is not concerned 'merely' with profit but also
with promoting desirable social ends; that busi-
ness has a 'social conscience' and takes serious-
ly its responsibilities for providing employment,
eliminating discrimination, and avoiding pollu-
tion. In fact, they are preaching pure and un-
adulterated socialism... (they) are unwitting
puppets of the intellectual forces that have been
undermining the basis of a free society these
past decades.9
According to the reasoning espoused by Friedman, bu-
sinessmen who spend money in a different way than they would
have spent it for maximization of the shareholders' profit
to act in accord with their "social responsibility" are, in
effect, imposing taxes, on the one hand, and deciding how
to spend the tax proceeds, on the other. In this process,
the businessmen are simultaneously assuming the functions
of the legislative and executive functions of government.l0
He decides whom to tax, by how much, by raising the price to
customers, lowering the wages of employees, or reducing the
returns to stockholders. He also decides how and for what
purpose to expend the tax collected, to improve the air or
9Milton Friedman, "The Social Responsibility of Business is
to Increase its Profits", The New York Times Magazine,
13 September, 1970.
Ibid. 
to fight poverty and crime.
The whole justification for permitting the cor-
porate executive to be selected by the stock-
holders is that the executive is an agent serv-
ing the interests of his principal. This justi-
fication disappears when the corporate executi-
ve imposes taxes and spends the proceeds for so-
cial purposes. He becomes in fact a public em-
ployee and a civil servant. On ground of poli-
tical principle, it is intolerable. If they are
to be civil servants, they must be selected
through political process. This is the basic
reason why the doctrine of social responsibility
involves the acceptance of the socialist view
that political mechanisms, not market mechan-
isms, are appropriate ways to determine the
allocation of scarce resources to alternative
uses. 11
The calls for "social conscience" by businessmen strengthen
the already too popular opinion that the pursuit of profits
is evil and immoral. Once this view is seriously adopted,
Friedman foresees a society ruled not by the forces of so-
cial consciences, but by the iron fist of government bureau-
crats. Thus, Friedman views with suspicion the claim made
by the doctrine of social responsibility that, unlike the
explicit collectivist doctrine, it can attain collectivist
ends without collectivist means.12





Now let us examine the ideas behind the social con-
tract theory. The social contract theory has a long his-
tory in Western civilization. Systematically developed
for the first time by Thomas Hobbes, it was later expan-
ded by John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau. "Any set of
reciprocal, institutionalized duties and obligations which
are broadly accepted by its citizens" can be described as
a "social contract" designed to make living together in
society orderly and palatable.
The duties and obligations, as defined implicitly in
a social contract, determine the structure and performance
of any society.13 Without such a "contract", a society of
man would lack cohesiveness, order, and continuity; and
ultimately may become intolerable, where each man is pit-
ted against another without common values.
A social contract, by establishing common values and
understanding which is the very characteristics of a social
consensus, in essence, becomes a foundation upon which a so-
cial consensus is built. Therefore, the content of a social
contract is the content of an ideology since an ideology is
defined as a tool which forms social consensus. Implicit
as both social contract and social consensus are, they are
13Beauchamp and Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business, p. 142
in this context, "ideology" and "social contract" is in-
terchangeable.
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nonetheless powerful in shaping the structure of society
and setting the criteria upon which performance is evalua-
ted. It provides individuals guidance in their social be-
havior as well as in their appropriate expectations with
respect to the behavior.1 5
Heretofore accepted social contract for business rests
upon the five notions of individualism, property rights,
competition, limited state, and specialization, styled by
George Lodge as "The Lockean Five". The five ideas, at-
tributed to John Locke, are the five components central to
traditional business ideology and legitimacy. Individual-
ism is closely related to the notion of equality, in the
sense of equality of-opportunity, as supported by tradition-
al business ideology. Property rights are sanctified as
the best guarantee of individual rights. Competition, as
articulated by Adam Smith, is regarded as the most efficient
means to maximize the uses of property. The state is limi-
ted in the belief that public interest is best advanced by
trade, free from government intervention. Lastly, special-
ization on a functional basis is assumed to lead to a heal-
thy whole.1 6
The ideas behind the traditional social contract (or
i5Beauchamp and Bowie, Ethical Theory in Business, p. 143.
16 George C. Lodge , The New American Ideology (New York:
Random House, 1976), pp. 9-11.
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business ideology) has existed for more than a hundred years
with only minor modifications because society has believed
17
that these ideas served social progress. Economic growth
was summed in terms of gross national product and was thought
to be the source of all social progress. In this belief,
the drive for profits by unfettered, competitive, private
enterprise was identified as the engine of economic growth.
Society, thus assumed that by furthering the interests
of the stockholders, society as a whole benefited. Cons-
traints on private enterprise, when imposed, were intended
to promote the continuance of the system (as in antitrust
legislation). The terms of a traditional social contract
and some modifying constraints were "the rules of the game"
which protected the game and assured its continuance.
Now society has changed its mind. Public sentiments
indicate society's desire to change the rules of the game.
The terms of the historical social contract for private
business have come under critical attack. Corporations
are charged with breaking their moral obligations, implicit
in the contract, by unethical corporate behavior as exposed
by current scandals (e.g. bribery, theft, falsifications).
They are also accused of neglecting to solve such social
17Beauchamp and Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business, pp. 143-
144.
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problems as pollution, racism, and urban blight.
To such accusations, the corporations can respond by
arguing that they do not have such a broad-based moral
obligation to resolve all of society's problems in their
contract with society. But the crux of the matter is that
the corporations have little choice, if society wants to
rewrite its contract with business, but to acquiece. It
is only prudential that business agree to rewrite the con-
tract since society has the power to do so unilaterally. 1 8
In spite of the changes in public demands from busi-
ness, the old ideas of Lockean Five are still regarded with
affection in public opinion. This ambivalence in public
attitudes toward business causes trauma since business is
forced by the public to shed the old practices of the free
enterprise system as embodied in the Lockean Five, yet at
the same time, continue to preach what they no longer prac-
ticed.l9 Thus, the large corporations exhort the doctrine
of Lockean Five as a source of legitimacy only to later
contradict it by their behavior.
As a result of these inconsistencies between their be-
havior and their supposed source of legitimacy, the large
corporations have played the leading role in the creation
18Beauchamp and Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business, pp. 149-150.
19George C. Lodge, "The Uses of Ideology for Managers" (Bos-
ton: Intercollegiate Case Clearing House, 1979).
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of the circumstances which continuously eroded the old
ideas of Lockean Five. They have tended to linger with
the old forms and assumptions even after those have been
critically altered. Without full cognizance of the effects
of their actions, they have unwittingly subverted their i-
deological base.
An apt example is drawn from the appeal made by the
lawyer for ITT in an attempt to stop a divestive movement
by the Justice Department. In effect, the lawyer argued
against
that old idea of competition (for)... public
interest requires ITT to be big and strong at
home so that it can withstand the blows of
Allende in Chile, Castro in Cuba, and the Ja-
panese in general. Before you apply the anti-
trust laws to us...(the government must) de-
cide what, in the-light of our balance-of-
payments problems and domestic difficulties,
the national interest is.20
The above is an appeal for a partnership between bu-
siness and government in order to serve the national inter-
est more efficiently. Here, it must be noted, the company
was arguing the ideological radical case by suggesting a
concept which radically departs from the traditional idea
2 0 Lodge, "The Uses of Ideology for Managers".
- |
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which underlies the antitrust laws, that public interest
emerges rationally from an unfettered, private competition.21
While large business enterprises have been forced to
depart from the historical social contract based on the i-
deas of the Lockean Five (individualism, property right,
competition, limited state, specialization) partly as a
result of public demands and partly due to the tyranny of
the annual balance sheet, the small enterprises still remain
comfortably consistent with the historical social contract.
Therefore what may be needed, are "laws" which realistical-
ly reflect the different role that large global enterprises
play from that of the corner drugstore.
In his unilateral denunciation of the notion of "corpo-
rate social responsibility", Friedman failed to differentia-
te the global corporations from the small ones in terms of
their social responsibility. Friedman draws a simple socie-
ty where any kind or size of business, left by itself, will
not only be efficient but also ultimately bring prosperity
to the whole society.
21 Lodge, "The Uses of-Ideology for Managers".
22 Richard J. Barnett, The Crisis of Corporations (New York:
AMACOM, 1975), p. 25.
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Today, the power accumulated by some global corporat-
tions can outweigh the resources of many nation states com-
bined. In the domestic scene, these huge corporations
cannot be treated as just another piece of private proper-
ty for they exercise power which affects the well-being of
whole communities. It has become in effect a social ins-
titution and should be treated as one. Hence, maybe the
ground rules under which corporate power is exercised should
be changed for the large corporations, so that social res-
ponsibility will become a fact of legal duty.23
If social responsibility is left as a matter of dis-
cretion and conscience, few individual corporations would
forego profits to make a social contribution. This is not
meant to be a cynical derrogation of corporate ethics but
rather a realistic assessment of the daily exigencies of
meeting the immediate interests of the corporation. Until
government creates a "market" for clean air, pure water, or
employment for the disadvantaged, the profit seeking corpo-
rations are not likely to be involved in those activities
extensively. Accusations of social irresponsibility hurled
against business are pointless if government fails to pro-
vide the necessary incentives.24
2 3 Barnet, The Crisis of Corporations, p. 25.
24Neil H. Jacoby, Corporate Power and Social Responsibility,
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1973), p. 190.
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An alternative to government incentives (whether in
the form of a market or in the form of a legal duty) is
for business to take a more active attitude towards social
responsibility, not because society no longer believes in
the "myth" of a free enterprise system, but because com-
munity needs can be best met by a cooperation of private
organization and government. The corporation can use its
tools of public relation to become "not a mere reactor to
changes in public values" but to become one of the many
sources of influence on "public values and legislation." 25
That business shapes public values and facilitates
rather than obstructs the changes called for by shifts in
public values may be viewed as desirable, but it has its
dangerous pitfalls as well. Collaboration between govern-
ment and corporations is feared to lead to totalitarianism.
When the functions of business and government are not sepa-
rated in all respects, the "danger is not that government
will run business, or that business will run government,
but rather that the two of them will coalesce... into a
single power, unopposed and unopposable."26 Another danger
lies in the failure to see the limitations of business in
25Jacoby, Corporate Power and Social Responsibility, p. 190.
26Theodore Levitt, "The Dangers of Social Responsibility,"
Harva'rd Busine'ss Re'view, September-October 1968.
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solving the problems of society which can result in in-
effective government and inefficient and unprofitable
business.27
In the preceding pages, we examined the alternative
views of social responsibility of business. At one ex-
treme, Adam Smith reincarnated in Milton Friedman, main-
tains the virtues of self-interest and bluntly insists
28
"business is business, not a philanthropy". Both Adam
Smith and Milton Friedman presumed that pursuit of self-
interest will result in a good society. So did most bu-
sinessmen and society by and large. At the other extreme,
critics are cynical about business contributions to a good
society and demand more restrictions on the role of busi-
ness. They argue for government intervention and public
enterprises.
Public attitudes towards business cannot be pushed back
to a time when business was idealized as a good citizen.
Demands made by society are not static, they are bound to
change in time and space, and these, in turn, exert pres-
sure on business communities. Today, society demands clean-
er air, purer water, safer streets, less traffic congestion,
2 7Lodge, The New American Ideology, p. 295-6.
28Arjay Miller, "The Social Responsibility of Business",
White House Conference: A Look at Business in 1990
(Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office,
November 1972).
better education systems, and so forth. The emergence of
a strong demand for the above mentioned public goods (as
opposed to private goods), is an expression of changes in
public value. This demand for public goods has not been
met by the traditional practice of private business.
At the same time, we must remember to distinguish
between the large and small private enterprises. Business
enterprise may be described as the goose that can lay gol-
den eggs. To come to the point, the burden of social res-
ponsibility has been forced upon all business enterprises
although, more appropriately, it should be carried by the
large private corporations. It makes no sense to penalize
small corporations and force them to play under the new ru-
les when they have not broken the traditional rules (Lockean
Five).
It seems only fair and efficient to allow the small
enterprises to continue to lay golden eggs. Given the pseudo-
governmental nature of large corporations and the potential
dangers of collaboration between government and business -
totalitarianism and inefficiency - there is a need for laws




VII. SOURCES OF HOSTILITY TO THE MARKET
Taking for granted that man's aggressive drives are
inherent in human nature, a competitive market system is
recognized for an unparalleled psychological achievement-
as the first to channel man's aggressive drives into cons-
tructive and creative uses.l Man's aggressive impulses
historically were expressed in two forms. One was in the
form of an internalized violence in which aggressions were
turned inward into extreme asceticism, The other was in the
form of an externalized violence which found expression
through wars, conquests, pillage, and plunder. Both ex-
pressions were destructive since one was self-punitive and
the other led to brutal devastation of communities and hu-
man lives. A redirection of man's aggressive tendencies
toward the competitive market is believed not only to be
constructive but also to bring superior economic results
for everyone. Thus, the emergence of the market system has
spurred another mode of outlet, this time, a creative and
constructive one, for the aggressive energies inherent in
all men.
1Lewis S. Feuer. "Some Irrational Sources of Opposition to
the Market System," in Ernest van den Haag, ed., Ca-
pitalism:' So'u'r'ces o'f Ho'sti'lity CNew Rochelle, N.Y.:
Epoch Books, 1979), p. 103.
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In spite of the above mentioned feat of capitalism, op-
positions to the market place and to the private ownership
of the means of production have deep roots, both rational
and irrational, which are difficult to contend with. One
of the major sources of hostility to the marketplace comes
from the constantly changing social perception of poverty,
Another comes from the ideas of the "intellectuals" who
oppose the "morally" unsophisticated workings of the mar-
ket system.2 I will look at the changed social perception
of poverty first, and then the ideas of the "intellectuals".
Man has proven to be one of the most adaptable crea-
tures. Hence his conscious perceptions are also adjustable.
His perception of poverty undergoes constant adaptations to
the prevailing environment. A man's perception of poverty
during a war or economic depression naturally differs from
his perception during a peace-time or inflation. If, to be
2I want to borrow the definition of an intellectual from
Irving Kristol. He said that "There is a difference
between an intellectual and a scholar.. between an
intellectual and an expert. An intellectual is a
person who conveys and transmits general ideas about
areas in which he is not an expert and usually areas
in which no one can be an expert... like what is a
good society, or what has happened to world history
in the past seven hundred years, or what is the mean-
ing of it all? ... "
From Irving Kristol, "Dialogue: The Relationship
Between Business and Government" in Alan Heslop, ed.,
Business-Government' Relations (New York: New York
University Press, 1976), p. 36.
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poor means to have less than what one physically needs to
survive, poverty would not be such a controversial issue,
except in some countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and
other underdeveloped regions. However, poverty is defined
"by history and society, and refers not to physical needs
nor to the size of incomes, high or low, but to the so-
cial judgement passed on income differences."3
In the United States, for instance, a person with an
income less than half of the national average, regardless
of the absolute size of the income, is considered to be po-
verty-stricken. But the traditional notion of poverty evo-
kes images of hungry, shelterless, destitute people, stir-
ring horror and miserable sentiments in the public. Becau-
se these images still shape our attitudes to poverty, we
would like to see it abolished. On the other hand, the con-
temporary meaning of poverty has come to be associated with
the notion of inequality, and "war against poverty" has be-
come identified with "war against inequality" and likely to
be an unwinnable battle.4
There was a time when poverty was accepted as part of
the natural order of human society. Today, very few people
3Ernest van den Haag, "Confusion, Envy, Fear and Longing,"




resign themselves to the "natural laws" of poverty. Pover-
ty is believed to be caused by "human laws", the short-
comings of human behavior. Therefore, poverty is no longer
considered as a tolerable social order. Since it is "no
longer accepted as part of the physiology of the body so-
cial, poverty has come to be treated as social pathology."5
Moreover, poverty is perceived as an "injustice" created
by private ownership of capital and its intrinsic tendency
toward exploitation and deprivation. As a result, poverty
is believed to be a social pathology caused/bred by the ir-
responsibility of the rich who have deprived the poor.
Thus, the wealth of the rich and the market system which
makes this possible are blamed for the condition of the
poor.
The existence of dissatisfaction is unavoidable in all
societies, however they are organized. We have yet to come
across an absolutely and universally satisfied society of
man. Particularly, as regards the distribution of income,
men naturally find it difficult, or are unwilling, to un-
derstand why they should receive less than others who seem
no more deserving. It is also incomprehensible why we
should receive more than so many others who seem to have as
great a need and whose deserts seem no less. "The farther
5Ernest van den Haag, "Confusion, Envy, Fear and Longing".
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fields always look greener - so we blame the existing sys-
tem". In an authoritarian system, the dissatisfaction is
leveled at the rulers. In a free market system, the dis-
satisfaction is aimed towards the market.6 Thus a combi-
nation of the changed perception of what is meant by "po-
verty" and man's envious and greedy disposition breed hos-
tility towards the market system.
Another source of opposition to the market system
comes from the "intellectuals". "Intellectuals" have al-
ways occupieda special place in societies of all cultures,
as a group distinct from other groups in society. Although,
in different cultures and at different times, "intellect-
uals" have occupiedvarying positions in the social hierar-
chy, societies have universally valued that intangible qua-
lity: of a developed mind. And "intellectuals", in the form
of philosophers and moralists, have played the role of mo-
ral arbiters in society. In a market system, intellectuals
are deprived of their position as producers of moral value.
The market system, by functioning under an "invisible hand",
has no need for the blessings of intellectual authority.
In contrast, socialism, working under a "visible hand" in
the form of central planning, provides a definite function
6Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (New York: Har-
court Brace Jovanovich, 1979), p. 32.
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for the "intellectuals".
In the free market, high incomes are not pre-ordained
but achieved by performing the services that are demanded
by society. There is no authority to bless our self-inter-
ested, self-motivated behavior in the marketplace. There
is no sanction that tells us we deserve what we get. Per-
haps we cannot stand naked in the market with only our
greed or self-interest to adorn our nakedness. Perhaps we
need the blessing of intellectual authority to absolve us
of the"guilt"which arises from our ambivalent feelings about
our own greed. While capitalist countries live under the
greatest prosperity the world has ever seen, the supporters
of the market system are an embattled minority, certainly
among the "intellectuals", as well as among other groups in
society. Today, Milton Friedman represents a dying species
as the sole intellectual authority to which capitalists can
turn to for the salvation of their distressed souls.
"Intellectuals" who revolt against the "automatic" na-
ture of a free market system, because it denies them their
power of influence, invariably turn toward anti-capitalist
appeals. "Many persons choose the 'intellectual' professions
because the economic rationality of the system is not attrac-
tive to them, and because of the power they think they will
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gain in a planned society." The radical and intelligent
students in the universities are most susceptible to this
intellectual disposition and are likely to choose teach-
ing or journalism as a profession. This inclination is
reinforced by the courses they take in college. The pro-
fessional socialization also gives them the training which
enables them to "rationalize their hostility" to the cur-
rent market system under the "guise of social reform and
humanitarianism"'.8 The studies on this subject indicate
that these students are characterized by strong drives for
power, high levels of generalized hostility, and a consider-
able amount of intellectual narcissism.9
Some "intellectuals" may resent the market because they
feel impotent and insignificant within such a system. In
a free market system, the price people pay for a good or
service is based on the economic value, not on any "moral
value". "Intellectuals", as the monopolistic producers of
morality or "moral value", feel "deprived of the power and
income they believe they deserve by virtue of their virtue."1 0
7Stanley Rothman, "Capitalism and Its Enemies," in Ernest van
den Haag, ed., Capitalism: Sources of Hostility, p. 184.
Ibid., pp. 201-202.
9Stanley Rothman et al.,"Ethical Variations in Student Radi-
calism", in Severyn Bialer, ed., Sources of Contempora-
ry Radicalism (Boulder, Colorado: The Westview Press,1977).
10Ernest van den Haag, "Confusion, Envy, Fear and Longing", p.28.
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Hence, they perceive capitalist society as a generator of
immorality and injustice. Intellectuals wish to substitu-
te their own perceived "moral justice" for the "random in-
justices" of the market place.
Unfortunately, moral excellence is rarely rewarded in
any actual social system. Even if the self-operating de-
cision mechanism of a market system was to be substituted
by conscious political mechanisms, moral desert would play
an insignificant role. Once the market is abolished as a
mechanism for distribution, it can only be replaced by a
bureaucratic distribution system.ll Where economic servi-
ces were rewarded by the market, political services will be
rewarded by such a political distribution system. Distri-
bution of power and income will derive from the "political
value", independent from the "moral value". Consequently,
society will be burdened with a system which is no more mo-
rally superior than the market, but which will undoubtedly
leave society poorer since it provides stronger incentives
for unproductive political. activities than for productive
economic ones. 12 Whatever political label is affixed to it,
the alternative to the market system is an inefficient, as
Ernest van den Haag, "Confusion, Envy, Fear and Longing", p.28.
Ibid., p. 29.
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well as morally arbitrary, bureaucracy.
Many "intellectuals" think that they will rise to im-
portant positions in the bureaucracy which will enable them
to apply their "moral justice" to the betterment of the
society. Actual practice is contrary to their wishful
thinking. "Intellectuals" are no more likely to be deser-
ted in a bureaucracy than in a market system. Positions
of power in a bureaucracy will be attained by those people
who specialize in the manipulation of bureaucratic power
13
rather than by the hapless "intellectuals".
As for the entrepreneurs who are challenged by the
hostile ideas espoused by "intellectuals", they do not ful-
ly comprehend the power of ideas spread by "intellectuals"
nor the nature of those ideas. Because they are oriented
toward action and achievement, rather than ideas, they lack
the skills to combat the "intellectuals" effectively.14 Mo-
reover, since the entrepreneurs are by and large not suffi-
ciently cognizant of the challenge, they are unable to defend
themselves accordingly.
Ernest van den Haag, "Confusion, Envy, Fear and Longing,"
p. 30.
1 4 Stanley Rothman, "Capitalism and Its Enemies,", p. 203.
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VIII. HOSTILITY TO THE MARKET IN THE LESS-
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
1. Western Origin of Third World Hostility
Some scholars in the West reject the market system as
a viable means to development. They have advocated central
planning to the developing countries as the necessary step
toward progress. The Western origin of hostility to the
market in less-developed countries (LDC's) is illustrated
in the following passages from prominent Western academics.
Gunnar Myrdal, a Nobel Laureate, writes of central planning
"as the first condition of progress. " l John P. Lewis of
Princeton University, former director of the U.S. Agency for
International Development in India considers it "the duty of
government (which)... cannot be delegated" to comprehensive-
2ly plan for development. Above statements are representa-
tive of the recommendations that some Western experts on de-
velopment offer to the Third World nations.
Gunnar Myrdal, An International Economy (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1956), p. 210, quoted by Peter Bauer,
"Hostility to the Market in Less-Developed Countries"
in Ernest van den Haag, ed., Capitalism: Sources of
Hostility (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Epoch Books, 1979),p.59.
John P. Lewis, Quiet Crisis in India (Washington: The Brook-
ings Institution, 1962), p. 28. Quoted by Bauer, "Hos-
tility to the Market in Less-Developed Countries," p.60.
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Academic opposition to the market is based upon theo-
retical developments in contemporary economic analysis which
underscore the imperfections of the market system. The op-
ponents of the market system have successfully transmitted
their ideas to the Third World, and the government in the
less developed countries have readily accepted and adopted
them in their policies. The opponents of the market domi-
nate the international communication of ideas on economic
development. What is an unfortunate fact is that views
which do not support central planning are ignored for sup-
posed lack of expertise. Thus, what lessons the Third World
has received from the West have come filtered through the
opponents of the market.3
This Western influence has, in turn, augmented the pres-
tige and authority of the opponents of the market within
the developing countries. The latter monopolize the local
dissemination of economic development theories and puts great
pressure on those local academics and businessmen who advo-
cate the market.4 Since the pro-market forces have to ope-
rate in societies under an authoritative power that is un-




compromisably influenced by the market-opponents, they
have little chance of making an impact on public opinion.
Throughout the LDC's, the discrepancies in political
effectiveness and in the capacity for public discussion are
very wide. The opinions articulated in the Third World
largely belong to government bureaucrats, politicians, in-
tellectuals, academics, writers, and mediamen, and to a
lesser extent by businessmen. Because of these discrepan-
cies, the hostility to the market, which commonly exists
in both the West and the Third World in different degrees,
can be translated more easily into practice.
Another independent source of hostility to the market
can be found in the official foreign aid. The aid, inter-
governmentally arranged, increases the power of the public
sector vis a vis the private sector in the economy. As a
source of money and patronage, in effect, it promotes go-
vernment-controlled economies. Furthermore, foreign aid,
including official loans, encourages the "politicization
of life, that is, the tendency to make everything a matter
of politics, and... provokes political tension... (and)
hostility to the market."5 I will discuss, in particular,
the politicization of economy in more detail in the follow-
ing section.
5Bauer, "Hostility to the Market in Less-Developed Countries,"
pp. 75-76. r
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2. Politicizati'o'n''o'f the Econ'omy
Most of the so-called less developed countries are
afflicted with an inescapable duality - modernity and tra-
dition exist side by side, oftentimes in conflic:t. The
country simultaneously offers "promise and frustration -
a symbol of potential, immobilized by contradictions in-
herent in its political, social, and economic institutions."6
Instead of dynamically developing from the old to the new
world, a nation that has attained many features of a modern
society, is unable to discard the traditional ways which
hinder the path to development.
Tradition still persists while the industrial organ-
izations introduced as the herald of a new world fail to
become truly modern. The country suffers both.from the in-
adequacies of a traditional society and from the inabilities
of a stagnant industrial one. One explanation for the fail-
ure of industries in the LDC's to modernize despite contin-
ual efforts in that direction may be found in the excessive
politicization of economic activity. I will look at the
6Stanley M. Davis, "Politics and Organizational Underdevelop-
ment in Chile," in Stanley M. Davis, ed., ''Compar'ative
Manageme'nt': O'rganizati'onal and 'Cul'tur'al 'Perspect'ive
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 189.
Ibid., p. 188.
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several causes and consequences of the "politicization of
the economy.",8
A. Ideological Underdevelopment and Discord
In the early periods of industrialization, the main
concern of the businessmen was largely to justify their
economic activity and, thereby, themselves to the rest of
society. With the subsequent consent of society to an in-
dustrial way of life, the preoccupation of the business
ideology shifted from external problems of winning public
acceptance to internal problems of coordination and di-
rection of the economic activity.9
This kind of historical process during which both bu-
siness and society would formulate a basic consensus for
industrialization was experienced by the first industriali-
zed countries through an effective political machinery.
However, this had not yet evolved in the developing coun-
tries for lack of appropriate political (or economic) in-
stitutions. Therefore, the ideological focus of the LDC's
has been unable to turn from the phase of external justifi-
cation to that of internal rationalization. Hence the ideo-
8
"Politicization of economy" in the context of this paper is
interpreted as a process in which the means to an eco-
nomic objective of an economic entity is political ra-
ther than economic.
9Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority' i'n Industry (New York:
Harper and Row Publishers, 1963) p. 9.
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logical emphasis in the LDC's is still predominantly exter-
nal to the economic organization. 1 0
In addition to ideological underdevelopment discussed
above, "ideological discord", caused by the mismatch between
the values pursued by the existing economic system and the
surrounding social values (or norms) manipulated by the po-
litically aggressive elites, further contributes to the po-
liticization of economy. As pointed out by Professor Ri-
chard D. Robinson of the Sloan School of Management, M.I.T.,
any given economic system can be justified through the use
of ideology.ll In fact, an active promotion of ideology is
part of the overall attempt by the political elite to main-
tain its power through a political use of its economic sys-
tem.
In this type of society, the goals of economic develop-
ment simultaneously require increased production and per-
sonal sacrifices in terms of personal consumption. These
dual requirements of development are the cause of the ideo-
logical discord since, on the one hand, ideology derogates
personal consumption as a social sin, yet on the other hand,
it pursues increased wealth and consumption.
10Davis, Comparative Management, pp. 208-209.
Richard D. Robinson, International Business Management,
2nd edition (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1978),
p.4 .
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Given the economic objectives of maximum production
and minimum consumption, the ideological appeal may lie in
"... realization of some nonmaterial reward for present ef-
fort, whether it be the pride of being a member of a super-
ior 'race', religion (secular or otherwise), or nation-
state, or all three." The desired social, economic behav-
ior may call for an "ideology" that "equates a high level
of consumption with sin ... something ideologically and
socially - hence morally - reprehensible."1 2
Hence, the ruling elite seeking economic development
through increased production and restrained consumption is
forced to adopt an ideology in which hard work is encouraged
mainly by nonmaterial reward. "The danger, of course, is
that an ideology embodying these values is very likely to
breed hostility toward systems offering immediate material
rewards and equating wealth with social esteem. And the: lat-
ter see the former as a threat. Indeed, both (ideological
and economic) systems view each other as possibly subversive.. V13
In such a country, the society is characteristically
at a cross road. It has not yet decisively committed itself
1 2Robinson, International Business Management, p. 4.
1 3 IbidIbid.
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either towards a capitalist path to developments nor towards
a socialist road nor a particular mixture of the two. The
businessmen in such an environment feel too insecure about
their position in society to turn their attention to the
internal ideological needs of the business. More often,
they feel that they have not sufficiently justified their
position in society, thus they are overly anxious of their
external image.
As long as the society has not determined whether or
not private enterprise will be a permanent feature of the
nation's economy, the businessmen will perceive this indeci-
sion as a threat to the survival of their system (private
enterprise) and themselves. 4 Under this condition, they
will seek to preserve their economic system through a par-
ticipation in the external political process rather than
through an economic one.
B. Regulation
Government intervention in the marketplace is justified
by the existence of a relatively small national market size
and the ensuing monopolistic tendencies by the few companies.1 5
14 Davis, Comparative Management, p. 209.
5 Ibid., p. 194.
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The market size of most developing countries, limited by
its population, geographic area, and demand tends to be
relatively small. A regional common market or trade as-
sociation would increase the size of the market by opening
up new trade opportunities. Small, industrialized coun-
tries of Western Europe have successfully formed such or-
ganizations, but many obstacles stand in the way of real-
izing such a goal among the developing countries. One of
them is the intense opposition voiced by the businessmen in
the LDC's who fear the loss of their protected position
within their country. Given the lack of regional coopera-
tion to extend the size of domestic markets, each developing
country faces the dilemma of a trade-off between the poten-
tial efficiency of monopoly and the ill-effects generated
by such industrial organizations.
The existence of a monopolistic position is regarded
as a shortcoming of the free market mechanism and, in turn,
calls for government intervention in the market in order to
compensate or even replace the market mechanism. Once ini-
tiated, regulations grow very rapidly by themselves and the
regulatory agencies become major sources of corruption. The
proliferation of bureaucratic regulations and restrictions
create enough red tape to discourage any business initiative
or innovation. Whether the issue is an import license, floa-
ting a loan, reducing inefficient labor or as simple as get-
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ting a driver's license, the numerous procedures and rules
can frustrate any businessman. The net effect of these
bureaucratic quagmires upon the businessmen is to induce
them to become increasingly preoccupied with political
challenges. Of the many regulations, the following two -
price control and credit rationing - deserve special at-
tention to illustrate the effect of government interfer-
ence in the marketplace toward the politicization of the
economy.
Price controls are instituted for various reasons -
to restrain inflation, to balance spending, to guide econo-
mic resources to determined areas, to protect national in-
dustry, to direct redistribution of income, and to instill
in the consumers an anti-inflationary mentality. A typical
response of the businessmen to price control is the search
for ways to circumvent or get a readjustment of the price
levels. One method is to introduce "new" products which are
trivial modifications of the existing products and to re-
quest a higher price setting.16 This results in a foolish
use of limited resources and R D function.
The point is not to chastize the managers for trying
to avoid the controls but to understand the managers' moti-
1 6 Davis, Comparative Management, p. 195.
-
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ve for thwarting the government control, Their motivation
is ultimately defensive in nature and is directed toward
circumventing or changing policies' rather than toward ef-
fectively fulfilling economic objectives.17 Businessmen's
oppositions to price controls are argued on the basis of
the ineffectiveness of the controls in producing the desi-
red results. They further insist that the controls reduce
their profits and consequently their incentives as well.
This chain of effects results in long term shortage of sup-
plies and a distortion of the total industry structure.
Shortage of capital can be regarded as a common deno-
minator among all the LDC's (with the possible exception of
oil exporting countries). But high rates of inflation and the
unreliable nature of stock investment caused by the underde-
velopment of the stock market eliminate potential sources
of capital by discouraging savings and capital investments.
The government's large expenditures on the service sector
coupled with its effort to maintain the country's financial
stability through tight-credit restrictions further dry up
the available medium and long-term credit needed to finance
medium and long-term business investment.
Business is obliged to turn to foreign loan which in-
1 7Davis, Comparative Management, p. 195.
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creases the economy's. external dependency and to short term
credit. The smaller companies which. feel neglected by the
credit rationing authority point out that the government,
which is in charge of the credit rationing, is vulnerable
to favoritism and corruption. The credit policies of the
government unavoidably politicizes the private enterprises.
The problem of capital shortage can actually be not
one of the amount but the way that the available capital is
used.18 Business opportunities have been hindered less by
the lack of capital than by the low utilization of capital.
The major causes of the underutilization of capital can be
attributed to the underdevelopment of financial institutions,
chronic uncontrollable inflation, government regulation on
price of the capital and the strong liquidity preference cau-
sed by the political uncertainty. In a situation of non-
price credit rationing due to government regulations, the
managerial implication is that firms should try to borrow
as much as possible. And the access to low cost funds be-
comes an overriding consideration in business decisions.
C. Familiy Ownership
As mentioned earlier, small markets of the LDC's tend
1 8Davis, Comparative Management, p. 195.
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toward monopolistic forms of industrial structure. On the
other hand, the monopolistic industrial structure in the
LDC's have typically also coalesced into economic organiza-
tions characterized by family ownership, particularly in
the absence of effective commercial law for the protection
of minority investors vis-a-vis the "insiders". A unique
feature of family-owned economic organization is a direct
link between personal gain and the security of the organiza-
tion. The well-being of the particular economic entity is
identical to the well-being of the owners, and the survival
of the entity is paramount to the survival of the family.
Therefore, government intervention in the marketplace
(for the purpose of regulation or economic planning) that
results in preferential treatment to one industry over ano-
ther, is, in effect, granting personal privilege and gain
to one family and personal loss to the other family which
owns the industry that was overlooked. "As a power structu-
re,... (the economy becomes) a loose federation of intensely
self-interested clans." l9 Government support of an industry,
though maybe set objectively by rational priority, becomes
a patronage of a specific clan because of the heavy concen-
tration of the industry and family ownership of the large firms.
19Paul W. Strassman, "The Industrialist" in John J. Johnson,
ed., Cont'i'nuity 'and 'Chang'e' in Lati'n' Ameri'ca (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 158.
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This intense concentration of the business enterprise
erodes the sense of identification of the society with the
interests of the enterprise.20 Any gain by the enterprise
is identified as a personal gain for the clan. The place-
ments to key managerial positions by family connections
rather than by competence or performance, the basically
patrimonial nature of management, and nepotism in manager-
ial succession all contribute to this perception.21
D. The Consequences of Politicization
The sum of the above factors (ideological underdevelop-
ment and discord, regulation, ineffective commercial law,
and family ownership) adds up to an excessive politiciza-
tion of the economy. Theoretically, businessmen may be-
lieve that effective management of corporate organizations
is the source of strength of private enterprise systems.
But reality departs from theory; and, in practice, he does
not apply this view to plan, organize and assess his busi-
ness activities.
Many businessmen feel that their system has not yet
attained a firm foothold in the LDC's and that it is under
20 Strassman, "The Industrialist", p. 162.
21Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers, Management in
the Industrial' World CNew York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company Inc., 1959), p. 178.
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ideological assault in such an environment. Although they
may believe that private enterprise has made substantial
contributions to their respective country's economic develop-
ment, their arguments based on "classical" explanations has
little meaning to many people in an LDC society. Such ex-
planations fail to present to the public a persuasive case
for private enterprise.
Notwithstanding the fundamental goal of business is to
make profits, once the system which is a prerequisite for
realizing this goal is threatened, business becomes distrac-
ted from that goal and concentrates on defending the system.
In such a situationthe means become an end in themselves;
whereby, an effective economic management becomes insufficient
in itself and may even be unnecessary.22
Since the dominance of one economic system over ano-
ther is the result of a power struggle, the survival of the
capitalist system is not an economic battle but a political
23
one. Greater profits will not necessarily improve the
chances for survival. It may actually contribute to the
breakdown of the system by increasing people's resentments
against business through their perception that business is
2 2Davis, Comparative Management, p. 198.
23 Ibid., p. 197.
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constantly taking something away from society. In effect,
the compulsion to justify the position and needs of busi-
ness to society supercedes the pressures to oversee the
activities of the company organizations. The businessman
embroiled in this ideological struggle must devote his ef-
fort to saving the private enterprise system as much as to
saving his own particular business.
Thus, the head of an enterprise comes to believe that
the prosperity of his company is contingent upon its ex-
ternal political power and not upon its internal operation-
al efficiency. Given this political orientation of the
head or owner of the company, the management of the company
comes to take on the same objective. The primary task of
the top management "is to influence the strategic power
centers in the environment - banks and governmental agen-
24
cies." The managers are evaluated on the basis of their
political connections rather than on their competence. The
preoccupation with the external political environment heigh-
tens the importance of national elections.25
Because the position of business is not yet secured,
an election is apprehended by the managers as the moment
24Davis, Comparative Management, p. 202.
Ibid., pp. 197-199.
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when the people and government decide whether. capitalistic
economy should be maintained, modified or abolished. Bu-
siness dreads a possible leftist electoral victory for fear
of socialization of business. Accordingly, the survival
of a firm is perceived to depend upon .t.he lection results.
Moreover, the election environment exaggerates ordinary
conflicts in everyday business into a class confrontation.
The idea that so much is at stake amplifies what was merely
a difference of opinion between a manager and a worker to
a class struggle between two uncompromisable ideologies.26
The perceived battleground can be described as a zero
sum game in which one side wins only to the extent that
the other side loses. Thus the employer gets richer by ma-
king the worker poorer, widening the economic gap between
them. In contrast, in a nonzero-sum game or a positive
sum game, a gain to one side does not necessarily cause a
loss to the other side. In other words, the employer gets
richer faster then the workers, hence there is "cooperation
in increasing the pie and competition in sharing it."2 7
When political ideologies are at war with one another
(as capitalism is inimical to Marxism) it is impossible to
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 6 Davis, Comparative Management, p. 203.
Ibid., p. 204.
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adopt a positive-sum approach since each decision is based
upon absolute principles which rule out any sort of compro-
mise. Under such conditions, management-labor disputes may
more likely result in strikes rather than mediation. 28 The
strikes, in turn, may widen the issue to the level of an
ideological struggle rather than leading to a compromise of
interest within an economic dimension.
Political management is described to exist
"where ownership, major policy-making positions, and
key administrative posts are held by persons on
the basis of political affiliations .... dominated
by political considerations,... the orientation
and interests of management are colored throughout
by political goals."
The complex tasks of modern industrial organizations
demand "non-political" professional management whereby
positions are held on the basis of demonstrated technical
competence and performance is assessed in terms of internal
organizational efficiency. Political management is untrai-
ned to cope successfully with the problems of modern large-
scale industry.30 However, this does not imply that manage-
28Davis, Comparative Management, p. 204.
29Harbison and Myers, Management in the Industrial World, p. 13.
3 0 Ibid., p. 75.
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ment can become completely immune from the outside political
environment. Even in the modern industrial countries, po-
litical considerations always arise in one degree or other.
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IX.' REGULATION
1. Pressur'e's' Towa'rd Gove'rnment' Reg'u'la't'ion
Business communicates with the public primarily through
the products it produces. A satisfied customer is the
most effective advertisement or public relations for a pri-
vate enterprise. This is a case in which rhetoric is se-
condary to actual performance. However, today's business
is confronted with an unfortunate situation of visible pu-
blic dissatisfaction with the results of business perform-
ance. This dissatisfaction reflects a change in public ex-
pectations from the private enterprise system and a shift
in the ground rules of what constitutes business responsibi-
lity toward many of the social problems facing society.2
The issue here is not whether there is a factual ground
for the dissatisfaction but why such dissatisfaction exists
and how it has been met.
The existence of dissatisfaction with the business sys-
tem must be accepted whether it has a factual base or not.
Robert T. Quittmeyer, The Lib'erati'on f 'the 'Consumer (New
York: Amstar Corporation, 1977), p. 4.
2Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Future of B'us'i'nes's Regulation
(New York: AMACOM, 1979), p. 59.
This is a common theme in many contemporary writings
on the subject.
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The problem that business faces is the fact that such dis-
satisfaction will lead to greater .g.overnment intervention
in business decision making.3 Therefore, it is essential
for the private enterprise system to understand the nature
of pressures which motivate government'expansion into bu-
siness activities.
A major catalyst for the movement toward central go-
vernment and increased government regulation is the changed
social perception of the proper role of private enterprise
and of the government. The views that support the expan-
sion of government function have gained much public accept-
ance. Economic fluctuations in the market system have pro-
vided convincing proof of the unstable nature of capitalism
to the public.4 Depressions, recessions, inflations, et
cetera all conjure up public fear and distrust toward the
free market. Images of crises dominate and they come to
believe that government intervention can offset the instabi-
lity generated by unregulated private enterprise. In a si-
milar vein, Marx also viewed economic cycles as part of
the process of inner contradictions which leads to the col-
3Weidenbaum, The Future of Business Regulation, p. 59.
4Milton and Rose Friedman, Free 'to 'Cho'ose (New York: Har-
court Brace Jovanovich, 1979), p. 70.
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lapse of a capitalist system.
Contrary to public sentiments and Marxists, some eco-
nomists view these fluctuations as a constructive part of
the capitalist process. Schumpeter saw economic cycles as
"a necessary and functional concommitant of the economic
progress capitalism brings for the whole population." 5
Schumpeter argued that sustained prosperity produces in-
efficiency and incompetence, and that these are elimiated
during the declining phase of the so-called "cathartic pha-
se". During the cathartic phase, all the inefficient pro-
ducers go out of business leaving only low-cost progressive
firms in the economy. Through this process, the economy is
brought back to good health again. Thus, economic cycles
are seen as part of the process of "creative destruction"
and as the price paid for freedom in the free enterprise
system.6
Another source of pressure toward government regula-
tion is increased public consciousness of "market failure"
caused by the presence of externalities. Market failure
arises because the third parties affected by an economic act-
5Francis X. Sutton et al., The American Business Creed,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1956), p 211.
6Ibid., p. 210. 211.
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ivity cannot be compensated or charged at a reasonable price.
In effect, third parties are subject to "involuntary mar-
ket exchanges." 7 Government regulation is regarded as a
means through which market failure can be corrected by di-
recting our resources more effectively to produce clean air,
pure water, and fertile land. Market failure explanation
may provide one valid justification for government inter-
vention.
Unfortunately, the very nature of market failure de-
fies satisfactory government solutions. The identification
of the particular persons who are hurt or benefited and of
the amount of harm or benefit is no less difficult for go-
vernment than for market participants. Attempts to replace
market participants with government rules and "to use govern-
ment to correct market failure have often simply substitu-
ted government failure for market failure."8 Moreover, a
government endeavor to rectify a situation may actually make
matters worse than before by imposing costs on innocent
third parties and bestowing benefit on undeserving bystand-
ers. The lesson to be drawn from the misuse of external ef-
fects is "not that government intervention is never justified
7Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose, p. 31.
8Ibid., p. 214.
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but rather that the burden of proof should be on its pro-
ponents. We should develop the practice of examining both
the benefits and the costs of proposed government interven-
tions and require a very clear balance of benefits over
costs before adopting them." 9
For instance, in the case of pollution, the real pro-
blem is not the elimination of pollution, but the establish-
ment of arrangements that will yield the "appropriate"
amount of pollution - appropriate in the sense that the
gain from reduced pollution balances the sacrifices in
terms of other goods and services. To illustrate with an
example, consider the case of air pollution. Given the
fact that the carbon dioxide which we exhale is one source
of air pollution, we could stop that very simply, but the
cost would clearly be unacceptable.1 0
Public advocacy of government regulation, particularly
of environmental externalities, some claim, tends to be
characterized by emotion rather than rational analysis of
the issue. The advocates, it is claimed, presume that pro-
fit-seeking firms are pouring pollutants into the atmosphere
out of malice and greed. They also perceive themselves as
9Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose, p. 32.
1Ibid., p. 215. An extreme but enlightening example by
Friedman.
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the noble crusaders of public good who must subdue the evil
men. The complexity of the issue seems to be ignored since
it may be easier to call other people names than to engage
in hard intellectual analysis." 1
2. Effects of Gover'nment Regulation
There is a general agreement that regulation inhibits
business innovation and facilitates industrial concentration.
The disagreements concern the degree of these impacts.1 2
The number of innovations introduced in the market can be
said to be inversely related to the number of government
regulations.1 3 The greater the number of certain types of
regulations, the longer it takes to obtain approval by the
relevant agencies (or the more costly the approval proce-
dure), the less likely it is that new products or process
will be introduced. Innovation becomes increasingly concen-
traded in the large conglomerates apparently because they
are better able to bear the additional costs and risks of
innovation than smaller firms. Moreover, a greater share of
1 1Milton and Rose Friedman, Free t'o' Cho'ose, p. 215.
1 2Murray, L. Wei-denbaum, The Future 'of B'us'ine'ss 'Regul'ation,
p. 39.
1 3Note that "regulation" is used loosely in this paper to
describe government's decision making in the place
of private business. It does not include SEC or
antitrust regulation.
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corporate R D budgets will be diverted from designing pro-
ducts with greater customer appeal to meet the requirements
of governmental regulatory agencies.14 This may increase
consumer dissatisfaction, encouraging further government
intervention.
The regulations also produce an anti-competitive result
because it reduces the ability of small companies to deve-
lop and expand.15 It must be noted that anti-competitive
results were unintended effects of government regulation.
They often hit small business unwittingly. Typically, the
standardized regulations fail to distinguish companies of
16different sizes. However, the impact of the regulation
on the small firms can be disproportionately high. Even
such tasks as filling out the same specialized forms as the
large companies, which have at its disposal large well-
trained technical staffs, puts a greater burden on the smal-
ler companies.
The government decision-making process can also ad-
versely influence capital formation. Uncertainty about the
future of government regulations concerning the introduction
of new products and process can discourage capital formation.17
14Weidenbaum, The Future of Business Regulation, p. 40.
1 5Ibid., p. 49.
1 6 Ibid., p. 51.
7Ibid., p. 24.
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An example is cited from the United States in the develop-
ment of new synthetic fuel. The major uncertainty of de-
veloping a new synthetic fuel industry was expressed to be
the potential delay of the project pending the issuance
that would stand in court.18 The uncertainty engendered
by the unpredictability of government regulation has af-
fected the length of the investment process as well.1 9
The investment process is further prolonged by the fact
that, with the proliferation of regulatory agencies, large
numbers of these agencies have the uncoordinated power to
reject a proposed investment application, but no single bo-
dy can give a definitive approval.
Governments, everywhere, proclaim massive programs to
develop one industry or another. The United States govern-
ment is no exception. Its recent claim is that, without a
government program to produce synthetic fuel, the country
will run out of energy. Governments presume that only go-
vernment-instituted programs can solve national problems.
Actually, the obstacle to solution may be the very govern-
ment regulations which block effective free market solutions.
As for the development of alternative energy sources by pri-
vate enterprise, the most important obstacle is the threat
of price control and regulation.20 Although it is argued
1 8Weidenbaum, The Future of Business Regulation, p. 24.
1 9 Ibid., p. 41.
20Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose, p. 221.
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that risks and capital costs are too great, "risk taking
21is the essence of private enterprise."21 Risks are not
reduced by virtue of a government program nor by the fact
that it is carried by the taxpayer instead of the share-
holder.
The increasing costs of meeting government regulations
further aggravate the capital formation situation. 2 2 Com-
panies are forced to close down because these costs make
them no longer economically viable. This, in turn, sets
into motion another round of government expansion ranging
from nationalization to subsidization programs for specific
industries. The process is a vicious circle.23 The conti-
nual expansion of the function and the power of government
is a self-reinforcing process. The end result may be grea-
ter public dissatisfaction than in the free market.
3. Conclusion
The existence of "natural monopolies" Csuch as electric
utilities and transportation companies) within the compet-
itive system obscures the benefits of competition. Whereas
21Milton and Rose Friedman, Free t'd Cho'dse, p. 222.
2 2 Murray L. Weidenbaum;The 'Fu't'ur'e o'f Bus'ine's's' Re'g'ulat'ion, p.25.
2 3 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
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most accept the fact that "natural monopolies" must be sub-
ject to some government regulation i,e, price and output
policy, the line between what constitutes "natural monopo-
lies" and what constitutes "naturally competitive" indus-
tries of the economy is really difficult.24 Competition
must be accepted as an ideal "like a Euclidean line or
point. No one has ever seen a Euclidean line - which has
zero width and depth - yet we all find it useful... ,25
Similarly, "pure" competition is also regarded as exist-
ing on the level of ideas but not in practice. Conceiva-
bly, every producer, no matter how small, can have some
effect on the price of his product. Therefore, it is not
possible to determine clearly whether an industry is to
be regarded as monopolistic or as competitive. 2 6
Of course, we cannot find "perfect" competition in
our world, nor "perfect" anything. Perfection, in terms of
product, service, creativity, virtuosity, or morality seems
to be an unattainable goal. However, market competition may
provide better consumer protection than alternative govern-
24Francis X. Sutton, et al. The American Business Creed, p.
179,180.
25Milton Friedman, Capitalism Freedom (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 120.
26 Ibid., p. 121.
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ment mechanisms when it is permitted to work under certain
27
circumstances. Consumers are protected in a competitive
system not because businessmen are more benevolent than the
bureaucrats, nor more altruistic, nor more competent, but
because it is in their self-interest.
We should also look at the fundamental differences be-
tween public and private planning.28 Corporate planning is
entirely based on efforts to persuade consumers to purchase
the goods and services produced by a given firm. The con-
trols which follow the plan are, therefore, internally o-
riented. In contrast, government planning involves coer-
cion in accomplishing the desired goals. Therefore, the
controls are externally oriented. The essential differen-
ce is in the locus of decision making. For instance, if a
private producer is not selling as much of his product as
he had planned, there is only so much he can do. He can low-
er the price, alter the product, or maybe close some fact-
ories. Whatever the case, the consumer is the ultimate de-
cision maker, since it is he who ultimately holds in his
hands the future of the producer. In the public sector,
there are more options available to the government to achie-
27Milton Rose Friedman, Free to'Choose, p. 222.
28Murray L. Weidenbay, the Future of Business Ragulation, p. 90.
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ve its planned results. For instance, let us assume that
the government wants to increase the sale or consumption
of automobiles. It can lower the price as much as it plea-
ses by tax reduction, or purchase outright the output of
the industry, or maybe even nationalize the entire industry.
The traditional assumption behind business planning is
that the "ultimate decisions on the allocation of resour-
ces in society are to be made by individual consumers." 2 9
The consequences of a "wrong" business plan - that is, an
erronous guess of what consumers will buy - may be to be
driven out of business. Whereas corporate planning is de-
centralized and revolves around the individual, public
planning is centralized and revolves around government ru-
lings. Government planning is based upon a fundamentally
different set of assumptions. As a sovereignty, it regards
as its inalienable duty the right to determine what the in-
terests of society are. When the public fails to respond
to its social objectives, its natural response is to create
new, more effective devices to make the public adjust to
the government's view of a good society.30 In sum, a pri-
vate enterprise that makes a serious mistake may go out of




business, but a government agency is likely to get a bigger
budget.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask in relation to
government regulation is not whether there are shortcomings
to the workings of the private sector. Shortcomings are in-
evitable and natural since human beings who operate the bu-
siness system are fallible. The result of some decisions
and activities of private enterprise may not always conform
to the prevailing notion of public welfare. However, go-
vernment regulations may only prove that the intended cure
can be worse than the illness. The pertinent question is
whether government regulation in each particular case can
achieve more good then harm given the various goals of so-
ciety. One answer to the above question is that the imper-
fect market may do as well or better than the imperfect go-
31vernment .
3 1 Milton Rose Friedman, Free to Choose, p. 218.
- 117 -
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ackerman, Robert W. The Social 'Challenge To Business.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.
Barnard, Chester. The Function of The Executive. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1938.
Barnet, Richard J. The Crisis of the Corporation. New-
York: AMACOM, 1975.
Bauer, Raymond C., and Ackerman, Robert W. Corporate
Social Responsiveness: The Modern Dile'mma. Engle-
wood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976.
Baughman, James P.; Lodge, George C.; and Pifer, Howard
W. Environmental Analysis for Management. Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1974.
Beauchamp, Tom L. and Bowie, Norman E., ed. Ethical
Theory and Business. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1979.
Bendix, Richard. Work and Authority' in Industry. New
York: Harper Row, 1963.
Bialer, Severyn, ed. Sources of Contemporary Radicalism.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977.
Bjork, Gordon C. Private Enterprise and the Public In-
terest. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.
Blodgett, T. "Showdown on Business Bluffing." Harvard
Business Rievew, May-June, 1968.
Carr, A.Z. "Is Business Bluffing Ethical?" Harvard Business
Review, January-February, 1968.
Chamberlain, Neil. The Limits of Corporate Responsibility.
New York: Basic Books, 1973.
Davis, Keith and Blomstrom, Robert L. Business and Society:
Environment and Responsibility. 3rd. ed. New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975.
Davis, Stanley M. ed. Comparative Management: Organizational
and Cultural Perspective. Englewood,N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1971.
- 118 -
Davis, Stanley M. and Goodman, Louis Wolf. Workers and
Managers in Latin America. Lexingron, Mass.: D.C.
Heath Co., 1972.
Friedman, Milton. "The Social Responsibility of Business
is to Increase its Profit." New York Times Magazine,
13 September, 1970.
. Capitalism Freedom. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962.
Friedman, Milton and Rose. Free to Choose. New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979.
Galbraith, John K. Age of Uncertainty. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1977.
. The New Industrial State. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1967.
Harbison, Frederick and Myers, Charles A. Management in
the Industrial World. New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Co., 1959.
Heslop, Alan. Business-Government Relations. New York:
New York University Press, 1976.
Hughes, Everett C. Men and Their Work. Glencoe, Illinois:
Free Press, 1958.
Jacoby, Neil H. Corporate Power and Social Responsibility.
New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973.
. ed. The Business-Government Relationship: A
Reassessment. Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear
Publishing Co., 1975.
Johnson, John J., ed. Continuity and Change in Latin Amer-
ica. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1964.
Kerr, Clark; Dunlop, John T.; Harbison, Frederick; and
Myers, Charles A. Industrialism and Industrial Man.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1960.
Levitt, Theodore. "The Dangers of Social Responsibility."
Harvard Business Review, September-October, 1968.
Lodge, George C. Spearheads of Democracy: Labor in the
Developing Countries. New York: Harper Row Publish-
ers, 1962.
- 119 -
. The New American Ideology. New York: Random
House, 1976.
· "The Uses of Ideology for Managers." Boston:
Intercollegiate Case Clearing House, 1979.
McDonald, John. "How Social Responsibility Fits the Game
of Business." Fortune, 11 February, 1980.
Madden, Carl H. Clash of Culture: Management in an Age
of Changing Values. Washington, D.C.: National
Planning Association,1972.
Marshall, Byron K. Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar
Japan: The Ideology of the Business Elite, 1868-1941.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967.
Mason, Edward S., ed. The Corporation in Modern Society.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.
Miller, Arjay. "The Social Responsibility of Business."
White House Conference: A Look at Business in 1990.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
November, 1972.
Monsen, R.J. Modern American Capitalism: Ideologies and
Issues. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963.
Mueller, Robert Kirk. The Innovation Ethics. New York:
American Management Association, 1971.
Nichols, T. Ownership, Control, and Ideology: an Enquiry
into Certain Aspects of Modern Business Ideology.
London, England: Allen and Unwin, 1969.
Robinson, Richard D. International Business Management.
2nd ed. Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1978.
International Business Policy. Cambridge, Mass.:
Hamlin Publications, 1973.
Roeber, Richard J.C. The Organization in a Changing En-
vironment. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Co., 1973.
Schein, Edgar H. "The Problem of Moral Education for the
Business Manager.: Seventeenth Conference on Science,
Philosophy and Religion. Chicago, August 1966.
- 12Q0 -
Steiner, George E. Issues' i'n 'Bus'i'ne's's 'and S'oci'ety, New
York: Random House, 1972.
Sutton, Francis X.; Harris, Seymour E; Kaysen, Carl;
and Robin, James. The Ameri'can Bus'ines's' Creed.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956.
Thompson Kenneth and Salaman, Graeme, ed. Cont'r'ol' and
Ideology in Organizations. Mildon Keynes, England:
Open University Press, 1980.
Van den Haag, Ernest, ed. Capitalism: Sources of Hosti-
lity. New Rochelle; N.Y.: Epoch Books, 1979.
Vogel, Ezra F. Japan As No.l. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1979.
Walton, Clarence C. Corporate Social Responsibilies.
Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing C., 1967.
Weber, Ross A. Culture and Management. Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1969.
Weidenbaum, Murray L. The Future of Business Regulation.
New York: AMACOM, 1979.
Yoshino, M.Y. Japan's Managerial System: Tradition and
Innovation. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968.
. Japan's Multinational Enterprises. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1976.
